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FOREWORD
Like the nine preceding sessions, the tenth Brandeis Institute for
International Judges was an enormous success. This report details the various
topics discussed and the range and depth of the conversations that occurred
around them.
Over the past thirteen years, the BIIJ has established itself as the only
event that regularly brings together members of the international judiciary and
provides them with a unique opportunity to meet and discuss important aspects of
international justice, especially as they relate to their varied jurisdictions.
The tenth BIIJ was held in Malta around the theme “International Courts,
Local Actors.” It was organized in collaboration with the University of Malta and
hosted on the university’s historic Valletta Campus, which dates back to the late
16th century.
Fourteen international judges from eleven international courts
participated. The discussions focused on the interactions that take place between
international courts and the full range of people and institutions found in any
given society. The discussions dealt with various scenarios in great detail, as this
report amply explains. In particular, the interactions between international courts
and local politics, the local impact of international justice, and the important role
and influence of NGOs engaged the participants and academics in attendance in a
highly interesting exchange of information and opinions. This could not have
been otherwise, given that the theme chosen for BIIJ 2015 was of immediate
relevance and interest in light of both current events and the increasingly
important roles played by a broad array of international courts on the global
stage.
The Institute ended with a public roundtable focused on the challenges
created by contemporary migration to Malta and other parts of Southern Europe.
The choice of topic and the discussion that it stimulated assume even greater
importance now, months later, as we witness the mass exodus of migrants to
other parts of Europe and the tragic end of thousands of them. Indeed, the plight
of these migrants calls into question the continent’s depth of commitment to the
universal protection of international human rights and respect for human dignity.
It is to the credit of the International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public
Life of Brandeis University and its Maltese partners to have foreseen the looming
crisis and created the opportunity for migrants, politicians, social scientists,
NGOs and the Maltese public to voice their views directly to the international
judges attending the BIIJ.
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I have no doubt that future BIIJs will continue to make a substantial
contribution to the better functioning and understanding of international courts
and tribunals.
Judge Carmel Agius
Vice-President
International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia
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PLENARY SESSIONS
I. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS IN
A GLOBALIZING WORLD
A. Introduction
The opening session of BIIJ 2015 addressed challenges that arise when the
requirements of the international legal order do not correspond with those of the
domestic legal order. Discussion began with reference to two articles, each of
which highlighted aspects of the international/local relationship. The first article,
1
by Judge Hisashi Owada, concerned the interaction between international and
domestic legal orders. Observing that the structure of these orders is changing as
the Westphalian model gives way to new forms of international relations in an
era of globalization, Judge Owada argues that “. . . the line between international
law and municipal law is becoming blurred . . .” and that “. . . a more permanent
paradigm for regulating the interaction between the international and domestic
2
legal order is called for.” Much of the discussion that took place over the course
of the Institute may be seen as a response to that call.
Focusing more on the interaction between international and domestic actors,
the second article by Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White advanced
3
the argument that “the future of international law is domestic.” Citing examples
such as cross-border pollution, terrorist training camps, refugee flows and
proliferation of weapons, the authors contend that, “international law must
address the capacity and the will of domestic governments to respond to these
issues at their sources. In turn, the primary terrain of international law must
shift—and is already shifting in many instances—from independent regulation
4
above the national state to direct engagement with domestic institutions.” The
multiple ways in which international and domestic actors interact provide the
second overarching framework for the exchanges that took place over the course
of the Institute.
BIIJ participants considered three judicial cases that show how domestic
courts are taking on international legal issues, and the challenges for both
domestic and international legal orders and actors that arise as a consequence.
The first case concerned the filing of a claim by Argentina in the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States of America, asserting that the
1. Hisashi Owada, Problems of Interaction between the International and Domestic Legal Orders, 5
ASIAN J. INT’L L. 2, 247 (2014).
2. Id. at 2.
3. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The
European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 329 (2006).
4. Id. at 328.
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United States had “committed violations of Argentine sovereignty and
immunities . . . as a result of judicial decisions adopted by U.S. tribunals
5
concerning the restructuring of Argentine public debt.” An act by the domestic
legal order of the United States is thus being challenged before the ICJ for its
alleged violation of international law and consequent adverse impacts on
Argentina.
The second case concerned Germany’s challenge to Italy’s Court of
6
Cassation decisions on the issue of immunity from wartime claims. The Italian
Court had held that jus cogens norms concerning violations of fundamental
rights in the context of war crimes had precedence over customary international
7
law principles like sovereign immunity. The ICJ, however, found that Italian
courts had violated Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by allowing lawsuits in
Italian courts for damages for war crimes committed by German forces during
8
the Second World War. Here again is an example of a domestic legal system
adversely impacting another state in contravention of principles of the
international legal order.
Developments in Italy after the ICJ decision further demonstrate the
challenges faced by states in implementing international law within a domestic
system. The ICJ decision called for Italy to implement immunity for Germany in
its national system through legislation or other means to ensure that its judicial
9
system did not infringe on Germany’s immunity. In response, the Italian
Parliament passed legislation implementing the ICJ judgment. Prior to that law,
lower courts in Italy deferred to the ICJ judgment by attempting to reconcile the
earlier Court of Cassation judgment with the ICJ judgment. These legislative and
judicial efforts, however, were then thrown into question as the Italian
Constitutional Court subsequently held that the legislation unlawfully
contravened a fundamental constitutional principle on access to a judge. There is
once again a direct conflict between the ICJ decision and Italian national law.
This situation is discussed in more detail below.
A third case for discussion came from the Constitutional Court of South
Africa, which was called upon to determine the extent to which the South African
Police Service (SAPS) had a duty to investigate allegations of torture by the

5. Press Release, Int’l Ct. of Just., The Argentine Republic Seeks to Institute Proceedings against the
United States of America Before the International Court of Justice (Aug. 7, 2014), available at http://www.icjcij.org/presscom/files/4/18354.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
6. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 ¶ 15
(Feb. 3).
7. Giuseppe Cataldi states there were twelve identical Court of Cassation decisions issued on this question
on May 28, 2008. See Giuseppe Cataldi, Implementation of the ICJ’s Decision in the Jurisdictional Immunities
of the State Case in the Italian Domestic Order, 2 EUR. SOC’Y INT’L L. 1 (2013).
8. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 6.
9. Id.

376

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47
10

Zimbabwean authorities against Zimbabwean citizens in Zimbabwe.
Responding to a request from the Southern African Human Rights Litigation
Centre to commence an investigation under South Africa’s International Criminal
Court Act on the strength of a dossier the organization had compiled, SAPS had
refused to investigate, citing principles of state sovereignty and complementarity,
along with the need for the presence of an accused to be on the territory of South
Africa in order to commence an investigation. Recognizing that the principle of
non-intervention in another state’s territory must be observed, the Constitutional
Court held nonetheless that an investigation could be conducted within South
11
Africa and ordered the SAPS to commence such an investigation.
As these three cases demonstrate, the challenges faced by states in
simultaneously adhering to the requirements of their domestic constitutional
orders while also fulfilling their international legal obligations are found across
the diverse international legal domains represented by Institute participants.
These include international human rights law, international criminal law, and
public international law.
Participants were invited to consider different aspects of the relationship
between international and domestic legal orders, taking both the articles and
cases cited above and their own experience as inspiration. Their discussion
subsequently revealed both tensions and instances of good practice. In what
follows, judges’ insights relating to the relationship between the legal orders are
summarized, as well as their views on the possible ways that coherence between
the international and the domestic orders might be improved.
B. The Relationship between International and Domestic Legal Orders
A central theme to emerge from the discussion during these sessions was the
role of the domestic constitutional order in determining the effective operation of
international law. This order determines not only the means by which
international law acquires the status of binding law within the jurisdiction of a
particular state but also the relationship between different organs of the state that
are involved in the implementation of international law. Thus, participants
discussed matters relevant to both the manner in which international law is
incorporated and how it is implemented in domestic legal orders.
1. How International Law is Incorporated into Domestic Legal Orders
Classical theories of international law envisage two systems for the
incorporation of international law in domestic legal orders. The “monist system”

10. Nat’l Comm’r of S. Afr. Police Service v. S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Litig. Ctr. and Another, 2014 ZACC 30
(CC) (S. Afr.).
11. Id. at ¶ 78.
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treats international and domestic law as being part of a seamless whole, with the
consequence that international law is directly applicable in domestic legal orders
without the need for implementing legislation. In contrast, the “dualist system”
sees domestic and international legal orders as distinct, such that international
law requires the enactment of implementing legislation before it enters into force
domestically.
There was recognition by some of the judges that the concepts of monism
and dualism did not necessarily reflect the reality of legal practice, and there are
indeed many variations of monism and dualism found in domestic legal orders
around the world. Thus, “dualist” systems may evidence instances of monistic
application of international law, while “monist” systems can enact implementing
legislation, which may even contain provisions that differ from the international
legal provision. However, although few systems may correspond to ideal notions
of dualism and monism, the practical implications that flow from a domestic
legal order describing itself as dualist as opposed to monist can be quite
significant indeed.
12
The discussion began with a reference to the Kadi case, in which the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was called upon to determine whether
the EU Regulation implementing a UN Security Council resolution against Mr.
Kadi was in accordance with EU law. Although the CJEU did not make findings
in relation to whether the Security Council resolution (binding on all member
states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) had precedence over “domestic”
13
(EU) law, the judgment has been described as being uncharacteristically dualist
in holding the implementing Regulation invalid as it failed to ensure due respect
for fundamental (constitutional) rights, including the right to property, the right
to judicial review, and the right to be heard. This vexing issue regarding the
primacy of international versus constitutional legal orders resurfaced many times
over the course of the Institute.
Participants then shared their perspectives on the operation of monist and
dualist models in the work of their international courts and tribunals, as well as
that of the domestic judicial bodies on which some had served. One participant
described the increasing willingness of some states to have their own domestic
courts preside over trials that have usually been conducted by ad hoc and special
criminal tribunals and by the International Criminal Court. Such willingness can
sometimes be stymied, however, if “international crimes” such as genocide have
not been recognized domestically in a country with dualistic practices. This has

12. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C415/05 P, P. Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n,
2008 E.C.R. I-6351.
13. Grainne De Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi, 51
HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 2 (2010).
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been the situation with at least one case that the ICTR transferred to a domestic
14
jurisdiction under Rule 11 bis of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure.
Dualist systems by name may, however, reveal instances of monism. One
judge with experience sitting in a dualist jurisdiction described an instance
where, owing to a lacuna in the domestic legislation, he felt required to directly
apply relevant international law notwithstanding the fact that the provision had
not been incorporated into the domestic legal order.
Another participant, reflecting on how judges can facilitate the introduction
of international law within a dualist system, observed: “Judges have the last say.
They can use international law to help the arguments. They are in a position to
import international law even in a formally dualist system if they are monist
enough in their thinking and attitude.”
Further permutations of the dualist system were also identified, including
instances of states within a federation enacting state-level legislation that
incorporates international legal provisions where the national parliament has failed
to do. The judge providing this example anticipated a challenge for judges at his
country’s highest court, should a state-level provision incorporating international
law be challenged at the federal level.
This scenario of uneven domestic implementation of international law is
reminiscent of the response of the United States in the ICJ Avena case on
15
consular relations. In that case, the ICJ held that the United States was in breach
of its obligations under Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations for failing to ensure that non-citizens enjoyed the benefits of consular
16
notification when detained by US authorities. With federal authorities unable to
17
enact legislation except for a provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal
18
Procedure, and a finding by the US Supreme Court that a presidential
19
memorandum requiring states to “give effect to the decision” could not take
precedence over state and federal limitations on issues that can be raised in
habeas corpus applications, it has fallen to states to take independent initiatives to
20
bring about piecemeal implementation of the judgment. One example comes
14. Rule 11 bis gave the Tribunal discretion to transfer selected ICTR cases to appropriate national
jurisdictions.
15. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.
31).
16. Id. at 72.
17. For a discussion of current efforts to pass legislation relating to the 2004 Avena judgment of the ICJ,
see U.S DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2013, at 26
(CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed.) (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/226409.pdf.
18. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
19. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the U.S. Attorney General, concerning the Avena
decisions (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87181.htm. (“ . . . the United States will
discharge its inter-national obligations under the decision . . . by having State courts give effect to the decision
in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that
decision.”).
20. See Case Concerning Avena, supra note 15.
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from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nevada, which decided in the capital
21
case of Carlos Gutierrez to order a new evidentiary hearing on whether the lack
of consular access was prejudicial to his case. This approach contrasts with the
response of the Texas judiciary, whose rejection of the presidential memorandum
gave rise to the Supreme Court litigation and ultimately led to the execution of
22
José Ernesto Medellín, one of the Mexican nationals in the Avena case,
notwithstanding concerns about the fairness of the trial in the absence of consular
assistance.
In light of the foregoing, a view may be reached that monist systems offer
greater certainty that international law will operate at the domestic level.
However, one participant involved in international criminal adjudication
observed, “ . . . most systems, even those that are monist, are not entirely monist.
There is always some limit in the constitutional system which gives priority to
the local constitution. And this inevitably requires local legislation.”
Thus, even states that have adopted a predominantly monist approach to
international law may still enact implementing legislation to incorporate pieces of
international law into the domestic legal order. In so doing, provisions in the
domestic implementing legislation may differ from the international provision.
One example is German legislation incorporating the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), wherein it is stipulated that the principle of
“command responsibility” shall be interpreted restrictively. The potential for
divergence was identified should the ICC provide a wider interpretation of
command responsibility at some point in the future. The participant observed that
the international community may “invent a statute, but the implementation of the
statute is not taken care of. Some states implement the statute partially, but I
don’t know of any state that has implemented the ICC statute completely.”
Moving beyond distinctions between monist and dualist legal orders, one
judge with experience sitting on a number of international criminal tribunals
observed: “We have had a system where national legislation in most countries
has lacked the tools to deal with international crimes.” This observation has
significant implications for the future of global justice as the international ad hoc
and hybrid criminal tribunals wind up their caseloads. Will the ICC have the
capacity to administer justice at the volume required by the ongoing perpetration
of international crimes? What role will domestic courts play in addressing such
crimes? And what steps are being taken to develop the tools that are required at
the domestic level? These issues were explored in greater detail in subsequent
sessions and will be revisited in this report.

21. Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012).
22. James C. McKinley Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2008),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/06/us/06execute.html?_r=0 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
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2. How International Law is Implemented in Domestic Legal Orders
The domestic legal order determines not only how international law is
incorporated, but also how it is implemented in practice. Executive, legislative
and judicial branches of a state can be engaged in the domestic implementation
of international law, including the decisions of international judicial bodies.
Sometimes, implementation is unproblematic, as one participant demonstrated
with an example of Bosnian implementation of a judgment from the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In the case of Maktouf and Damjanović v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court held that Bosnia had breached Article 7 (no
punishment without law) of the European Human Rights Convention by handing
down lengthy custodial sentences to convicted persons that were authorized
under a law enacted after the commission of the offenses for which they were
23
convicted. Following the ECtHR judgment, the Bosnian constitutional court
invalidated the sentences and remanded the matter to the state court for
sentencing.
Another example of a domestic legal order responding proactively to the
requirements of global justice was provided by one participant with experience of
the early days of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). With judges eager to start work on cases, a preliminary requirement was
to secure suspects, some of whom were abroad. Taking the example of Germany,
the participant observed that there had been a willingness on the part of the
German authorities to transfer suspects on their territory to the ICTY, but an
inability to fulfill any such requests owing to the absence of domestic legislation
to empower domestic courts to order such a transfer. In that case there was the
political will to enact appropriate legislation, as a result of which the suspects
were eventually transferred to The Hague.
However, domestic political processes may also inhibit the swift resolution
of disconnects between domestic and international legal orders. A judge familiar
with the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)
recalled the case of DaCosta Cadogan v. Barbados, which concerned the
statutory imposition of a mandatory death sentence in all cases where an accused
24
is convicted of murder. The Court, on finding a violation of several provisions
in the American Convention on Human Rights, required Barbados to take “the
legislative or other measures necessary to ensure that the Constitution and laws
25
of Barbados . . . are brought into compliance with the American Convention.”
The government of Barbados has expressed its willingness to comply with this
2009 judgment, but as of 2015 its parliament has yet to pass amending

23. Maktouf & Damjanović v. Bosn. & Herz., App. Nos. 2312/08 & 34179/08, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 76 (2013).
24. DaCosta Cadogan v. Barbados, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 204, ¶ 2 (Sept. 24, 2009).
25. Id. at ¶ 128.
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legislation. The judge recognized the challenges inherent in passing amending
legislation, noting that such a process “may require the cooperation of the
opposition as well as other actors outside of the parliament.” He added that
politics was not the only factor affecting the implementation of international
judgments, observing, “a lot of the issues relate to the capacity and resources to
deal with the judgments.”
This last example raises the much-discussed issue regarding the distinction
between non-implementation and non-compliance with the judgment of an
international judicial body. At what point will the domestic obstacles to
implementation amount to non-compliance? The issue of non-compliance due to
a political decision, in contrast to an institutional impediment, is addressed in the
next section of the report.
One participant observed that, particularly in cases where a state is organized
as a federation, such as in Russia and Australia, supreme courts may be reluctant
to find that a judgment of an international judicial body requires the judgment of
the highest court in one of the states of the federation to be altered. This
reluctance reflects a delicate political balancing between state and federal legal
and political orders, but is also a consequence of the domestic constitutional
order that will generally prevent a higher court from directing another court to act
in a certain way. An example relating to cases where a national court orders the
detention of crews and vessels was provided, and it was observed that when the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) subsequently finds the
decision of the national court to be contrary to the state’s international legal
obligations, “the end result is that the decision . . . is subsequently not
implemented but compliance is assured by the highest court.”
Additionally, it was observed that supreme courts sometimes prefer to find
ways of securing compliance with an international judgment with reference to
domestic legal provisions rather than by acknowledging the authority of the
international judicial body. According to one judge, some courts consider that “it
is unacceptable to be in a situation where an international judicial body can be an
appellate court that can instruct a national court to act in a certain way.”
A participant with insight into the relationship between the African Court of
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) and the supreme courts of signatory
states noted a similar antipathy to international bodies on the part of some
national judges. This judge recounted: “When we meet the chief justices, the
first thing they say is, ‘This is a sovereign state. Why do we need an African
court?’ We say: ‘We recognize you are sovereign and that is why we require
that local remedies must be exhausted before people can come to our court.’
Then they say, ‘If local remedies must be exhausted, and if we have dealt with
the matter up to the highest level, then why should they be able to come to your
court?’”
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26

Reflecting on the approach taken by the ICJ in the Avena case, one judge
observed that one way to address the tension between international and domestic
courts is to invite states to rectify an identified breach by means of their own
choosing. This approach allows states, in the judge’s words, “to try to bridge the
gap in order to . . . make international laws domestic.” Further thoughts on how
the manner in which judgments are drafted may affect their impact at the
domestic level are reported in Section V of this report.
Matters become still more complicated when any legislative amendments
required to give effect to an international judgment are seen by the domestic
judiciary as conflicting with fundamental constitutional provisions. The example
of the response of the Italian authorities to the ICJ judgment in the Jurisdictional
27
Immunities case was raised by one participant, who described how the Italian
Parliament had passed legislation accepting the UN Convention on State
Immunity and expressly requiring that final judgments relating to awards for
violations by Germany in the Second World War be set aside. The Italian
Constitutional Court, however, held that the legislation was unconstitutional and
28
could not be applied. The reasoning of the Constitutional Court was that, while
it is for the ICJ to determine the character of the customary international law on
sovereign immunity, the Italian constitutional provision accepting customary
international law as part of domestic law cannot have effect where the customary
international law runs counter to a fundamental principle of the constitution, such
as the rule that victims must have redress especially where violations are of rules
29
of jus cogens, as was the case here. The judgment of the Constitutional Court
thus holds that, notwithstanding Article 94 of the statute of the ICJ requiring
countries to implement the decisions of the ICJ, Italy is unable to do so where
such implementation would result in a breach of fundamental constitutional
principles.
This Italian constitutional dilemma was seen by several participants as
30
sharing some of the characteristics of the Kadi judgment. However, one
participant noted some distinctions, including the fact that the Kadi case
concerned a Security Council resolution, which could have been drafted in such a
26. See Case Concerning Avena, supra note 15.
27. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 6.
28. The judgment has only been published in Italian. Corte Cost (Constitutional Court), 22 octobre 2014,
n. 238/2014 (It.), available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2014&numero
=238 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). For further information on the judgment, see
Serena Forlati, The Italian Constitutional Court Rules on Immunity of Foreign States from Civil Jurisdiction: A
New Twist in the Ferrini Saga, ALDRICUS (Oct. 27, 2014), http://aldricus.com/2014/10/27/the-italianconstitutional-court-rules-on-immunity-of-foreign-states-from-civil-jurisdiction-a-new-twist-in-the-ferrinisaga/.
29. Corte Cost (Constitutional Court), 22 octobre 2014, n. 238/2014 (It.), available at http://www.
cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2014&numero =238 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
30. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C415/05 P, P. Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n,
2008 E.C.R. I-6351.
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way as to minimize any constitutional challenges, whereas the complicated legal
challenge in the Jurisdictional Immunities case arose from the judgment of a
domestic court and the international judicial body was called upon to help resolve
the issue. At the same time, both cases reflect instances of “domestic” nonimplementation of international law on the basis of the requirements of the
domestic constitutional order. It is thus seen that domestic actors will often take
steps to bring their legal orders into compliance with international law, but there
are also instances where political and constitutional forces directly interfere with
the implementation of international law.
Not all states experience constitutional dilemmas, however, when
encountering international legal obligations. One participant pointed to the
Peruvian constitutional legal order as an example of a system that affords the
same status to international agreements as it does to domestic constitutional
provisions, with the express recognition of the supremacy of international
agreements.
Whereas modern constitutions such as Peru’s offer one model for increasing
31
coherence between international and domestic legal orders, other approaches are
also possible. In what follows, the views of participants on potential ways of
improving coherence are presented.
C. Improving Coherence between International and Domestic Legal Orders
So far, this opening section has reported the observations of participants
regarding relationships between international and domestic legal orders in
particular instances. However, a number of more general observations were also
made by participants about the overarching framework within which
international and domestic legal orders interact.
Setting the scene for this discussion, one participant made the following
observation, which describes the Westphalian legal order based on the
sovereignty of nation states as being in need of structural improvements to take
account of the changes brought about by globalization:
“There is an inherent dilemma in the Westphalian legal order when state
sovereignty dominates. The social reality of the international community
is such that it requires a more regulated framework, possibly with a
hierarchical order built into it. I don’t think that, [owing to] the basic
fundamental nature of the Westphalian legal order we live in, it is
possible to have a harmonious framework . . . We a need mechanism for
consultation, either formally or informally.”

31. See e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PERU, Oct. 31, 1993.
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In the absence of such a structure, which this participant considered
desirable, it is left to the actors themselves to identify ways of bringing about
greater coherence between the legal orders. This can be seen in the way the
Nevada Supreme Court reasoned concerning one of the complainants in the
32
Avena case, and as the Italian courts ruled in trying to reconcile the
33
constitutional challenges presented by the Jurisdictional Immunities case.
For another participant, the starting point was to recognize that “governments
prefer to comply with international law rather than not comply. Where
compliance bumps up against contrary political interests is another matter—but
the preference is to comply.”
Other participants also noted, however, clear examples of states being willing
to opt out of the system of international justice when it suited their interests. A
highly publicized situation concerned the US decision to refuse to comply with
34
the judgment of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. Other examples are provided in
Section II of this report, as there are clear political dimensions to this
phenomenon. However, the focus here is on the structure of the international
legal system that makes it possible for states to “pick and choose” how they use
international law, not the fact that they do so.
Holding out the Peruvian constitutional order as an example of a system
that openly embraces international law, one participant identified what he
considered to be the positive implications of having a domestic legal system
that encourages coherence with the international legal order: “Experts believe
that this is a way to increase human rights in the country. Why? Because the
more signals that Peru provides that [it is] a community that respects human
rights and due process of law, the more it will be considered a serious country.
The country had the Shining Path, revolutions, and a man who was president is
35
now in jail. So the idea is to provide the signal that [Peru] is respectful of
everything, the main purpose being to attract investment.” For this participant,
there is thus a strong business case to be made for increasing the coherence
between domestic and international legal orders.
This same participant pointed to other Latin American states that, in his
view, had placed a greater premium on national sovereignty with the
consequence that they have experienced numerous challenges before both the
IACtHR and the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ). In relation to the latter
institution, some cases involve states asserting their sovereign right to “protect
their consumers, industries and welfare, and [those states] forget about the main
principle of using trade for increasing the welfare of the community.”
32. Case Concerning Avena, supra note 15.
33. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 6.
34. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27).
35. The reference is to Alberto Fujimori, who is currently serving a sentence after conviction by a
Peruvian court on charges of human rights violations.
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One participant identified a statutory obligation in his country for judges to
bring serious problems in the law to the attention of a law reform commission,
which is mandated to consider such matters and advance recommendations to the
government to address the issues. A similar system which would impose a
binding obligation on international judges to forward concerns about the
operation of the international legal system to a similar kind of law reform body
was, in this participant’s view, a desirable and practicable way of addressing
some of the problems that arise in the context of international adjudication.
Responding to this proposal, another participant expressed cautious interest, but
noted that the tradition of judges to refrain from discussing cases they have been
involved in could present difficulties in referring any problems with the operation
of the law to such a body.
Another participant suggested that international judicial bodies address some
of the challenges that arise in the operation of the international legal order
directly in the text of their judgments. He argued that courts and tribunals could
follow the proactive lead of international human rights courts, where judgments
point to a need for states to address elements of the domestic legal order that
counter the principles of international human rights law. Taking the
36
Jurisdictional Immunities case as an example, he continued, the ICJ could have
been more proactive by perhaps providing stronger directions to states parties,
using terms like “should” rather than “could” when recommending that
negotiations be entered into by Germany and Italy with a view to providing
reparation to the victims of war crimes committed by the Nazis during WWII.
D. Conclusion
To the extent they are willing to recognize and abide by international legal
obligations, sovereign states are bound by the agreements they enter into, as
well as by principles of customary international law and rules of jus cogens.
The domestic constitutional order will determine whether international law is
directly binding or requires implementing legislation, and whether international
law or the domestic constitution has primacy. Although it may be the case that
most states intend to adhere in good faith to the requirements of the
international legal order, it is clear that the Westphalian paradigm underpinning
the international system provides room for states to prioritize domestic
obligations and interests over international ones, creating instances of discord
between international and domestic legal orders.
In this section of the report, the views of participants on the legal obstacles to
coherence between international and domestic were presented. In what follows,
the political side of the relationships between international courts and domestic
actors is explored.
36. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 6.
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II. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC LEGAL ACTORS
A. Introduction
International courts and tribunals are affected in varying ways by domestic
political realities, which in turn are affected by the work of these international
judicial bodies. The purpose of the second BIIJ session was to focus on these
political realities and to consider whether and how judges should engage with
them.
Providing a background context for the discussion were four academic
articles. The first, by Tom Ginsburg, starts by recognizing the aspiration to
“construct a zone for autonomous legal decision-making, immune from political
37
considerations, to resolve international disputes,” and goes on to identify
various ways in which that aspiration has not been realized in practice. Notable
political influences, some of which were raised for discussion by participants,
include the method of appointment of international judges and the different
approaches taken by states to respond to judgments. Ginsburg also discusses
ways in which international courts and tribunals respond to political pressures,
for example by communicating with non-state actors and actively avoiding
politically sensitive questions.
An article by Laurence Helfer and Karen Alter explores the relationship
between the legitimacy of international courts and tribunals and what they term
“expansive” judicial lawmaking, focusing on judgments from the CJEU, the ATJ,
38
and the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States.
Noting that the judgments of these courts reveal varying degrees of
“expansionism,” the authors advance the argument that it is not the way in which
international courts reach their judgments that gives rise to challenges to their
legitimacy, but rather the mere fact that the court reaches judgments that are
unpalatable to domestic political actors. As one participant put it, “nobody likes
to lose.” How states respond to an adverse decision by an international judicial
body was in clear focus during discussions.
Participants also considered a report prepared by Diane Orentlicher which
raises the question whether international courts and tribunals, and particularly
those with criminal jurisdictions, should be judged according to the impact they
39
have on the regions directly affected by their work. The report addresses
questions of impact on both victims and perpetrators, as well as on domestic legal
37. Tom Ginsburg, Political Constraints on International Courts 484 (Univ. of Chicago Pub. L. & Legal
Theory, Working Paper No. 453, 2013).
38. Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, Legitimacy and Lawmaking: A Tale of Three International
Courts, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 14 DUKE L. J. 479, 481 (2013).
39. DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, SHRINKING THE SPACE FOR DENIAL: THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN SERBIA 12
(2008).
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orders and the wider public. Although the report focuses on the impact of the
ICTY, discussion during the session revealed that similar questions are faced by
other international courts, especially regional human rights courts and, to a lesser
extent, inter-state dispute resolution bodies.
40
Finally, an article by Ruti Teitel discusses difficult cases such as the NATO
intervention in Kosovo during the Balkan conflict and the judgment of the CJEU
41
in the Kadi case. These cases are seen as presenting challenges resulting from a
lack of alignment between legal and value systems. In the Kosovo example, the
question concerned whether there was a legal basis for NATO intervention into a
humanitarian crisis. In the Kadi case, the question concerned whether a Security
Council resolution whose implementation would interfere with fundamental
42
rights under the European Union constitutional order was nonetheless binding.
For Teitel, the international judiciary is well placed to grapple with these hard
cases by virtue of their being “at least partly detached or autonomous from
national political cultures and constitutionalism . . . and with the authority of high
43
human values.” The moment values come into the frame of judicial decisionmaking, however, the issue of judicial activism also appears. This issue gave rise
to a range of different opinions during session discussion.
In presenting the insights from this session, the report will first identify the
main stakeholders who were seen as being “politically” engaged in the work of
international courts and tribunals. Focus then shifts to the ways in which
domestic political forces can be seen to impact on these institutions. Finally, the
discussion turns to the question of whether and how judges should address
political influences on their work, as well as their role as political actors in their
own right.
B. Stakeholders and Interests
“The court has many clients,” observed one participant early in the
discussions. In what follows, the different “clients” of international courts and
tribunals are identified.
Individuals who are victims of international crimes or human rights violations
comprise one group of stakeholders with specific interests in the operation of
international courts and tribunals. As Orentlicher demonstrates in her report, some
of the interests of these stakeholders include seeing justice done in individual
44
cases, but also in creating a record of the events that took place.
40. Ruti Teitel, Kosovo to Kadi: Legality and Legitimacy in the Contemporary International Order, 28
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 105 (2014).
41. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C415/05 P, P. Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n,
2008 E.C.R. I-6351.
42. Id. at ¶ 46.
43. Teitel, supra note 40, at 111.
44. ORENTLICHER, supra note 39.
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In a situation perhaps unique to hybrid courts, where proceedings take place
within the geographic area where the relevant events occurred, one participant
noted the possibility that judges themselves could fall within the category of
victim, particularly in the context of mass atrocities. The distinct possibility that
the decision-making of such judges could be influenced by their own experiences
was an issue that required further consideration.
Domestic and international civil society actors—some representing the views
of victims, others representing the position of the accused, and still others, in
differing judicial contexts, representing other interest groups—may also have an
impact upon the work of international courts and tribunals. More attention will be
paid to the work of civil society actors in Section IV of the report.
States are, as the discussion revealed, highly political actors. However, the
state itself is not monolithic, and executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government may perceive obligations and interests in relation to international
judicial bodies differently. As one participant observed, “ . . . executive
authority and leadership, processes of law-making and legislative activity, the
implementation of policy often by the executive branch, by leaders or
administrative structures, contests for power between parties and interest
groups, public opinion and public discourse—all of these have connections
with and influence upon international courts and tribunals.”
Another participant observed that it is not only parties to an international
agreement that may have political influence on the work of associated courts and
tribunals, as the example of the position taken by the United States, Russia and
China towards the ICC demonstrates. The issue of selective justice was raised in
this connection, with one participant noting that these states are not subject to the
jurisdiction of the ICC, yet they retain the power to initiate referrals to the ICC as
well as to veto referrals. For this participant, in light of such an arrangement, “the
discussion with respect to international justice actually stops.”
Politics, according to some, could be seen to play a role even at the point
when states consent to be bound by international or regional agreements. One
participant made reference, for example, to the recent accession of the
Palestinian Authority to the Rome Statute, which has been seen by
commentators as a decidedly political act intimately connected to the ongoing
45
conflict between the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
Last, but not least, international judicial bodies, as well as the individuals
who work within these institutions, are themselves political actors with personal
and institutional interests that can affect how they operate. Referring to the
suspension in 2010 of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
45. See e.g., Miša Zgonec-Rožej, Palestine’s ICC Accession: Risks and Rewards, CHATHAM HOUSE (Jan.
8, 2015), http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/16604 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); Ido Rosenzweig, Guest Post: The Palestinian Accession to the Rome Statute and the Question of the
Settlements, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 22, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/01/22/guest-post-palestinian-accessionrome-statue-question-settlements/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Tribunal and the later decision to ultimately constitute a new Tribunal with
jurisdiction restricted to inter-state matters, one judge recounted: “[What]
happened to the Southern African Tribunal has had a chilling effect on judges.
When you want to say anything, colleagues will remind you what happened to
the SADC Tribunal. Maybe you don’t want a job anymore? Judges are human
beings and are affected by local politics.” An express reason for suspending the
Tribunal was the fact that judges had made several findings against Zimbabwe in
46
cases brought by individuals.
In a similar vein, a participant highlighted the challenge faced by
international judicial bodies in addressing the demands of multiple stakeholders
while simultaneously protecting their own institutional longevity. “The
judiciary . . . have to try to please . . . the general public—the individual who
should benefit from the rights enshrined in the Convention, NGOs and
international organizations. [At the same time there is the] inclination of all
international organizations . . . for self-preservation. The institution wants to keep
going, and there are interests invested with people working there for life,
amongst others.”
47
This participant referred to the Hirst case, which concerned the voting
rights of prisoners and the highly politicized response of the UK government. He
then identified the subsequent Scoppola v. Italy (No 3) case as a potential
example of how human rights courts can be affected by political reactions to their
48
judgments. In that case the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that Italy had not
breached the applicant’s rights under Article 3 of Protocol 1 by depriving him of
the right to vote, given the way in which Italian legislation had carefully
distinguished the circumstances in which the right to vote can be deprived, thus
differentiating the case from Hirst. For this participant it was “easy to see the
[Scoppola] judgment as a retreat of the Court from the position in Hirst. Of
course it is couched in legal arguments but it is easy to interpret the judgment as
[as a way of avoiding] this negative reaction. ‘Let us save face here . . . ‘.” The
consequence of such “sensitivities,” he continued, is that “the Court runs the
danger of being less assertive in holding up the rights of the individual whose
interests it is meant to protect.”
Some courts, on the other hand, appeared to embrace assertiveness to a point
approaching political activism. One judge described an institutional initiative
entailing “ . . . getting into countries and getting in touch with entrepreneurs,
consumer NGOs, and the judiciary to make them our allies to push governments

46. SADC Tribunal, S. AFR. DEV. CMTY., http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/ (last
visited Aug. 26, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Q&A on The Tribunal: Regional
Court’s Future Hangs in the Balance, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/
08/11/sadc-qa-tribunal (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
47. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 681 (2005).
48. Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (2012).
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to have [a certain] kind of legislation. In the end this will reflect and create a
better standard of living.”
In what follows, the observations of BIIJ participants regarding some of the
political dynamics that operate between the different stakeholders are presented.
Ways in which domestic politics impact on the work of international courts and
tribunals are discussed first, then the ways in which these international judicial
bodies impact on local realities.
C. Ways in Which Local Politics Impact upon the Work of International Courts
and Tribunals
In many ways, this section reflects some of the central concerns that were
addressed during BIIJ 2015. International judicial bodies interact with a variety
of different stakeholders in a range of scenarios that vary in their political
character. Domestic and international legal orders are operated by actors whose
interests and circumstances at times incline them towards active collaboration
and at other times towards non-cooperation. This political aspect is distinct
from, but closely interconnected with, technical legal factors such as
constitutional constraints on the powers of different branches of government,
which can impede or promote the implementation of international law in
domestic arenas.
Political forces may operate at many levels—exclusively within a domestic
arena, between domestic and international actors, and between international actors
themselves. In some scenarios, the power relations between the actors are
pronounced, to the extent that it is possible to analyze interactions from a
perspective whereby one party acts and the other is expected to respond in a
relatively vertical power relationship. Such scenarios include those where states
are expected to implement the decisions of international judicial bodies as well as
scenarios where states determine operational aspects of international courts and
tribunals, such as in the setting of budgets and the appointment of judges.
At other times, the relationship between international and domestic actors is
more horizontal, and entails an expectation of cooperation rather than
compliance. Such scenarios include, for example, cooperation in tracking
suspects in international criminal cases.
These two types of relationships are described in more detail below.
1. “Vertical” Relationships
a. Scenarios where States are Legally Subject to the Jurisdiction of the
Court
As a point of departure, several participants considered how political factors
operate differently depending on the kind of international judicial body in focus.
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Thus, one participant saw a meaningful distinction between human rights courts
and international criminal courts and tribunals. It was observed that human rights
courts deal with situations where states have taken a decision in a certain matter
and it falls to the human rights court to “overrule or not to overrule” in a kind of
supervisory context, as in the Hirst case noted above. Here the concept of
“subsidiarity”—which recognizes the primary responsibility of states to
implement and enforce the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the European
49
Convention on Human Rights —creates a situation where the court, in reviewing
the actions of the national authority, can be seen, in the words of one participant,
to “create problems after a matter has been discussed and carefully balanced in
the Supreme Court and legislative assembly.” This same participant considered
that national politics would interact differently with the ICC. That Court operates
on the basis of “complementarity” whereby either the domestic authorities or the
international authorities would adjudicate without the same kind of review
function.
A number of judges in attendance identified what they considered to be a
distinctly political aspect of the work of some international criminal courts and
tribunals, namely the requirement to engage in “extra-legal activity” as part of their
judicial function. One example provided was that of Article 53 of the ICC Rome
Statute, which grants the Pre-Trial Chamber the power to review a decision of the
Prosecutor not to pursue a prosecution where it is determined that such action
50
would not be “in the interests of justice.” The concern was that this provision
requires judges to apply reasoning of a political, as opposed to a judicial, nature,
which those who commented considered to be undesirable and problematic.
A similar concern was raised about provisions for judges to be involved in
reconciliation work, on which one judge commented: “The most difficult issue is
when a court is given tasks that are not judicial, the reconciliation task for
instance. It is not a judicial task [although] criminal courts are frequently given
that task . . . [The judicial] role is to be just and to deliver correct judgments.
Other [tasks] are for states.”
In addition to the differences noted between international human rights and
international criminal courts and tribunals, some participants observed a
distinction between international courts and tribunals adjudicating matters
concerning individual claimants and those addressing inter-state disputes.
Although both types of body could be affected by politics, it was considered that
the ways in which they were affected were different. At the same time, it was
recognized that even inter-state dispute resolution bodies are called upon to
consider questions of individual human rights from time to time. For example,
ITLOS has had to deal on a regular basis with human rights considerations
relating to the detention of vessel crew members.
49. See e.g., Scordino v. Italy (no. 1), App. No. 36813/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006-V, ¶ 64 (2006).
50. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 183/9 (1998), art. 53.
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Differences aside, as the discussions in this session revealed, many of the
political pressures faced by international courts and tribunals are shared across
the full gamut of mandates and jurisdictions. Participants observed several ways
in which the domestic political realities of parties to a case impact on the work of
their institutions. One clear way is when states refuse to cooperate with the work
of international courts and tribunals. Within the ICC context, the example of how
the Kenyan authorities responded to charges brought against the then future
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in relation to post-election violence in 2007–
51
2008 was considered illustrative. Indeed, one participant noted that President
Kenyatta seemed to be elected on an “anti-ICC platform.” Reflecting on
scenarios such as this where domestic politics works actively against the work of
international judicial bodies, one participant remarked that some countries ratify
conventions “in order to get the human rights community off their backs . . .
without the intention of being bound or to participate.”
Domestic political factors were also seen as impacting the work of inter-state
dispute resolution bodies, such as the ICJ, ITLOS and others. Making reference
to the arbitration proceedings concerning maritime jurisdiction initiated by the
Philippines against China under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of
52
the Sea (UNCLOS), one participant noted that political factors in China
contributed to that party’s decision to refuse to recognize the jurisdiction of the
Arbitral Tribunal to hear the case. Under Article 288 of UNCLOS, disputes over
53
jurisdiction are to be determined by the relevant court or tribunal. However, in
this case the Chinese authorities chose instead to circulate an official paper
54
setting out their position that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
The impact on international law was considered significant by this participant as
the action represented a denial of what is considered to be a major achievement
of UNCLOS, namely the consent by signatories to submit to compulsory dispute
resolution procedures.
A third aspect of the impact of local politics on the work of international courts
and tribunals concerns the question of compliance with international judicial
decisions. What emerged from the discussion was that international courts and
tribunals are highly invested in seeing their judgments implemented at the domestic
level, while recognizing that a range of political and constitutional forces can make
implementation a challenge for local actors. Domestic actors may be very willing

51. Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Withdrawal of
Charges against Mr. Kenyatta (Mar. 13, 2015), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1936247.pdf.
.
52 Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in
the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China (Dec. 7, 2014), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_
662805/t1217147.shtml.
53. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art.
288 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
54. See Position Paper, supra note 52.
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to comply with judgments of international judicial bodies, although notions of
national sovereignty and situation-specific political evaluations can sometimes
discourage cooperation at the local level. One participant noted that there may even
be a longer-term initiative within some states to disregard the decisions of
international courts with the intention of changing domestic law in that same
direction in the long run.
There are also instances where domestic political factors incline actors
towards active non-cooperation with international judicial bodies. A participant
55
brought up once again the Hirst case in which the ECtHR found that the United
Kingdom law excluding all prisoners from voting in parliamentary or local
elections breached Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. He observed that the government of the United Kingdom had taken a
56
decidedly political approach to the judgment and had refused to amend its
legislation over the course of many years. Here then, is a clear case of politically
motivated, undisguised non-compliance with international law, as distinct from
earlier identified instances of non-implementation owing to impediments within
the domestic legal and political orders. A participant observed, “where politics
come into play, a certain incompleteness of these legal systems becomes very
apparent.”
Similar observations were made in the session devoted to the local impact of
international justice on the management of migration in Malta, in light of
recurrent ECtHR judgments finding the country’s practices to be in breach of its
obligations under the European Convention. It was noted that a preponderance of
negative public attitudes towards migration in Malta might help to explain the
slow pace of change in the Maltese approach to immigration control.
One judge recognized the challenge that non-compliance with the judgments
of international judicial bodies presents to the public legitimacy of these bodies.
Discussing a case where a member state had delayed paying damages awarded by
the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), the judge observed that the failure to pay
“attracted a lot of debate and criticism of the process and threatened to
57
undermine the Court in the eyes of the regional population.” He considered that
a provision within the constitution of the member state giving judgments of the
regional court the same status and force as judgments of the supreme court of the
country would have enabled the claimant to take domestic legal action to enforce
the judgment of the regional court.

55. See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 681 (2005).
56. Including Prime Minister David Cameron, who declared that the idea of prisoners having a right to
vote made him “physically ill.” See Alex Aldridge, Can ‘Physically Ill’ David Cameron Find a Cure for His
European Law Allergy?, GUARDIAN (May 6, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/ may/06/davidcameron-european-law-allergy (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
57. Myrie v. Barbados (State of Jamaica Intervening), Judgement, [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ), (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2013-CCJ-3-OJ.pdf.
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Another interesting mechanism for enforcing judgments of international
judicial bodies was identified in the context of the order made by the SADC
58
Tribunal against Zimbabwe, introduced above. One participant noted that
Zimbabwe had refused to comply with the judgment awarding costs, but the
claimants had successfully secured their award for the payment of legal costs
through the South African Courts, which ordered the sale of assets owned by
Zimbabwe. This participant noted that there had been a diplomatic upset in this
connection, with Zimbabwe claiming sovereign immunity, and South Africa
asserting that sovereign immunity in this connection was waived when
59
Zimbabwe joined the SADC Tribunal.
In contrast, one judge noted the practice of his own state in relation to
judgments of international courts and tribunals: “We comply with the
decisions . . . In cases of human rights it is very clear. The IACtHR says ‘A’ and
we apply it directly . . . It is of direct application. . . . There is an award and the
injured party will then go to Ministry of Economics through the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and they have to pay. Usually we do our best to comply with
whatever the Court says, so . . . the kind of problems we have discussed here
are alien to us.”
This observation triggered a more general comment by one participant, who
returned to a point made earlier in the discussion about compliance with the
judgments of international judicial bodies and how it might be seen as a
surrender of national sovereignty. Why not see such compliance as a positive
exercise of national sovereignty instead? The participant wondered what kinds
of factors might encourage states to see their relationship with international
judicial bodies in this light. Some possible benefits were identified, including
the economic benefits of being seen as a country that complies with its
international obligations and respects the rule of law, as well as the ability to
“outsource” matters that cannot readily be resolved domestically.
What should a state party do when it considers that the decision reached by
an international judicial body contradicts fundamental principles of international
law? One participant gave the example of the Yukos case that came before the
60
arbitral tribunal under the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994. In three arbitrations,
an identically constituted tribunal held unanimously that the Russian Federation
“had taken measures with the effect equivalent to an expropriation of Claimants’
investments in Yukos and thus had breached Article 13(1) of the Energy Charter

58. Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v. Fick, 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC) at 3, para. 5 (S. Afr.);
SADC Tribunal, supra note 46
59. Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v. Fick, (5) SA 325 (CC) at 10, para. 19.
60. Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, Case No. AA 226 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
July 18, 2014) Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, Case No. AA 227 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. July 18, 2014) Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Fed’n, Case No. AA 228 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. July 18, 2014).
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61

Treaty.” The Russian Federation was ordered to pay a total of more than US$
50 billion to former shareholders of the Yukos oil company. However, Russia has
asserted that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
claim because Russia had not ratified the Energy Charter Treaty, from which the
62
jurisdiction of the tribunal purportedly derived. The participant noted his
expectation that Russia would choose not to comply with the judgments in these
cases, from which no onward appeal on the merits is available.
Finally, a perhaps unique position enjoyed by international judicial bodies is
the power they have to question the basis of their own existence. Arising first in
63
the Tadić case before the ICTY, the challenge that the UN lacked jurisdiction to
establish an international criminal tribunal has also been raised before the Special
64
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in the Ayyash case. Discussing the latter, one
participant noted the occasional need for international courts and tribunals to
consider the lawfulness of the actions of their parent body, here the UN Security
Council. In both the ICTY and STL cases, there had been a challenge to the
establishment of the international judicial bodies following a claim that the
Security Council had been acting ultra vires in establishing them, given a defense
contention that in neither case was there a threat to international peace and
security. The fact that the tribunals have the power to review the actions of the
Security Council and to take decisions accordingly indicates that the power
dynamics between parent bodies and international criminal institutions are not
always unilateral, notwithstanding the examples of the subordination of
international justice to political calculus, as will be reported below.
b. Scenarios Where Courts are Subject to the Political Power of States
Political factors are at least as apparent in scenarios where states operate
from a distinct position of power in relation to international courts and tribunals.
States exercise this power through means such as direct intervention, judicial
appointments, and the setting of budgets.
61. Final Awards Issued in 3 Arbitrations Between Former Shareholders of Yukos and the Russian
Federation, PERMANENT CT. OF ARB. (Jul. 31, 2014), http://www.pca-cpa.org/shownews3be5.html?ac=view
&pag_id=1261& nws_id=440 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
62. Refer to the interim awards on jurisdiction, which have an interesting discussion on the constitutional
separation of powers as it relates to the binding nature of signed, but not yet ratified, international treaties
starting at para. 350 of each interim award. Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation,
Interim Award, Case No. AA 226 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 30, 2009) Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v.
The Russian Federation, Interim Award, Case No. AA 227 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 30, 2009) Veteran Petroleum
Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Fed’n, Interim Award, Case No. AA 228 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 30, 2009).
63. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May
7, 1997).
64. Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Decision on Appeal by Counsel for Mr. Oneissi Against the Trial Chamber’s
Decision on the Legality of the Transfer of Call Data Records, Case No. STL-11-01/T/AC/AR126.9 (Special
Trib. for Leb. July 28, 2015).
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The example provided earlier, of the decision to suspend the SADC Tribunal,
shows direct political intervention into the work of an international judicial body.
Participant discussion suggested that there appears to be a particular scope for
this kind of scenario in the work of international criminal courts and tribunals.
For example, speaking of an international hybrid court, one participant noted that
the filing of an application had been rejected, apparently because a senior
political figure had expressed opposition to two cases proceeding.
Similarly, speaking of the work of the ICC, one participant noted how the
Security Council may introduce political considerations into the operation of the
Court. For example, the Council referred the Darfur situation to the Court on 31
65
March 2005 after the passage of Resolution 1593, but then failed to support the
Court in its endeavors to have Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir surrendered to
its authority. It was as if, said a participant, the Security Council had first
“switched on” the Court but later decided to “switch it off.”
The observation made in the Ginsburg article cited above, regarding how
domestic political considerations influence the process of appointment of judges
66
to international courts and tribunals, resonated with some participants. Speaking
about the ACtHPR, one participant observed that the foreign ministers of
member countries elect the Court’s judges, and their continued service on the
bench depends upon re-election. There is a potential for political considerations
to influence both the initial election and re-election of judges.
Speaking about the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC), one judge discussed the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, which is a
politically controlled body with the ability to take disciplinary proceedings
against judges, and which is also responsible for promotion and demotion of
judges on a professional career path. At one point in the history of the ECCC, it
was discovered that all of the Cambodian members of the bench were members
of the ruling political party.
The setting of budgets was also brought up as a significant issue facing
participants’ respective courts, with several participants noting how financial
control of their court can be used to achieve political ends. One participant noted
the sometimes uncomfortable position of judges “wining and dining” with
politicians to this end. Another participant from a regional court recounted an
“acid” discussion with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of one member state
regarding the state’s unwillingness to provide the money required by the court.
A final aspect of the vertical relationship between international judicial bodies
and parent bodies concerns the reliance by the former on the latter for support in
the enforcement of their mandates. One participant recounted that when the newly
founded ICTY sought assistance from UN peacekeepers in the execution of arrest
warrants, the domestic political considerations of Security Council members
65. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
66. See Ginsburg, supra note 37.
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effectively prevented that kind of cooperation from taking place. He noted: “ . . .
everyone . . . took it as a given that the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia would
quickly jump to execute arrest warrants. They were in control. They had the
firepower and soldiers. It was assumed that as a sister UN Chapter VII
organization we were on the same team, and it came as a huge shock that UN
troops said they would not make arrests.” Similarly, participants recounted that
even when an initiative for ICC criminal prosecutions has come from the Security
Council, that body has not been supportive when states decline to cooperate. This
was very clear in the case of Sudan, whose government has refused to turn over
President Omar al-Bashir following the ICC charges brought against him, with the
Security Council doing nothing to enforce that state’s cooperation.
2. “Horizontal” Relationships
At times, the relationship between international judicial bodies and
individual states can have a predominantly horizontal character, for example in
the case of international criminal courts and tribunals and states associated with
criminal investigations and/or proceedings. Relationships may involve
cooperation in providing evidence, tracking and extraditing fugitives, and, in the
case of hybrid courts, much closer interaction between the international body and
domestic political and legal structures. In some cases, the relationship can be
characterized as collaborative, if not always without incident. At other times, the
relationship can be entirely uncooperative.
a. Cooperative Relationships
The example provided earlier of how Germany amended its legislation in order
to facilitate the transfer of suspects to the ICTY may be considered an example of
good practice both in terms of the relationship between executive and legislative
branches of government within a state and that between the German state and the
ICTY.
Notwithstanding good intentions, BIIJ participants identified scenarios where
certain domestic political actors wanted to facilitate the work of international
courts and tribunals but were prevented from doing so by local conditions.
Providing an example from the STL, one judge noted the desire of the Lebanese
authorities to see criminal trials take place with the five accused in custody, but
they had been unable to implement arrest warrants. As a consequence, the
Tribunal had to commence proceedings with the accused in absentia. Similar
difficulties had been observed by judges serving on the ICTR bench. One judge
with experience of that Tribunal observed that political obstacles had sometimes
hindered assistance with tracking fugitives, making arrests, conducting
investigations, and securing witnesses.
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b. Non-cooperative Relationships
At times, these operational impediments may extend beyond conflicts
between domestic political actors and entail non-cooperation at the state level.
Such a stance is exemplified by the Rwandan authorities’ success in avoiding the
prosecution of any of the members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) before
the ICTR, despite a UN Commission of Experts conclusion in 1994 that war
67
crimes had been committed by RPF members. Another example of noncooperation is the volte face of the Museveni government in Uganda regarding
the prosecution of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leaders, following the initial—
and what some participants considered politically-motivated—invitation to the
68
ICC Prosecutor to investigate crimes against humanity in the country. The
recent transfer of LRA leader Dominic Ongwen to the ICC, however, shows a
69
swing of the pendulum back toward cooperation. A perhaps more striking
instance of non-cooperation was the recent obstruction of the Kenyan authorities
in response to ICC charges against political leaders for crimes against humanity
70
stemming from 2007–08 post-election violence.
D. Strategies for Managing Political Aspects of the Relationships
In light of the discussions that took place and considering the observations
from the academic commentators whose works were consulted for the session, it
was not disputed by participants that local political realities interact with the
work of international judicial bodies in multiple ways. However, experience and
opinions differed considerably when discussion turned to the question that was in
part raised by the Teitel article regarding whether and how international judges
71
should engage with political factors in their work. Discussion focused to a large
extent around the question whether international courts and tribunals should
consider the impact of their work on local political realities, but also on strategies
for responding to the political pressures that have been described above.
For some BIIJ participants, this question was seen as having “existential”
significance for the international judge, as it enquires into the limits of the

67. Letter from the Permanent Rep. of Rwanda to the President of the United Nations Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1115 (Sept. 29, 1994).
68. Mark Kersten, Sudan’s President and ICC’s Most Wanted to Visit Uganda?, JUST. IN CONFLICT (May
11, 2011), http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/05/11/sudans-president-and-iccs-most-wanted-to-visit-uganda/ (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
69. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Dominic Ongwen Transferred to The Hague (Jan. 20, 2015), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/pages/pr1084.aspx (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
70. Anthony Deutsch, Global Court to Reopen Obstruction Case Against Kenya, REUTERS (Aug. 19,
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/19/us-kenya-court-idUSKCN0QO0RB20150819 (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
71. See Teitel, supra note 40.
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international judicial function. In what follows, strategies and considerations
relating to the management of political interference in the operation of the court,
approaches to drafting judgments, the importance of communication, and
problems concerning the implementation of judgments are reported.
1. Managing Political Interference in the Operation of the Court
At one extreme of the spectrum, the need for judges to actively confront
political interventions in the work of international courts and tribunals was
identified. One judge with experience of hybrid courts recounted an experience
where confrontation was chosen as the necessary strategy: “We needed to bring
[a particularly egregious intervention] to the attention of the international
community. The matter could have gone further than it did, but that could have
destroyed the court itself. It was not for us to destroy the court . . . but to draw
attention to the matter and for others to consider what should happen. This
resulted in a great deal of unpleasantness for period of about a year.”
2. Approaches to Drafting Judgments
For some judges, adopting a “business as usual” approach was considered the
most appropriate way of responding to some forms of political pressure. One
participant advocated such an approach in the context of politically sensitive
cases, noting that, rather than having a particular strategy or trying to send a
signal through a judgment, judges should “try to stick to normality, or business as
usual. The more you make a situation special, the more you increase the tension
and suspicion that the court is not acting judicially, but acting politically.”
Not all participants considered adopting a more “political” approach to
judicial decision-making as necessarily problematic. The approach described by
some as “judicial activism” was considered by several participants to be
appropriate and desirable in some cases. There were several aspects to this
approach.
One feature of “judicial activism” involved how legislation is interpreted,
with several judges advocating a purposive or teleological approach. Judicial
activism was firmly rejected by some other participants, with one judge saying,
“I disagree with those ideas. [International judges] have only one mandate; to
decide in accordance with the law . . . [Judges] should work according to a
narrow and legally correct agenda. Only that will be accepted by the entire
international community.”
However, as the Teitel article demonstrated, it may not always be possible to
identify what one participated called a “narrow, legally correct agenda” in hard
72
cases. Although time did not permit detailed discussion of this question, a
72. Id.
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helpful reformulation of the question was, “what happens when the law does not
provide all the answers for the problems bubbling up?” This question was seen as
being “extremely important” by one participant and may invite further reflection
at future Institutes.
3. The Importance of Communication
Irrespective of their position on judicial activism, many participants agreed
that communication is a crucial aspect of the work of the international judiciary,
whether that entails communication with national political and judicial actors or
with the wider public.
Communication was seen, for example, as an essential element in the
operation of the STL, as it strives “to account to the people of Lebanon for what
[the Special Tribunal] is doing.” Speaking to the media, while choosing the times
when it is and is not appropriate to do so, was considered of paramount
importance.
Judicial dialogue was one communicative approach that many participants
regarded positively, although there were different meanings that could be
attached to the concept. Some courts, such as the ECtHR, have institutionalized
the process of dialogue with domestic courts. In this process, judges from
domestic courts in member states visit the Strasbourg court for discussions with
international judges. The ECtHR judges themselves also travel to Council of
Europe countries to meet with national judges, and this is “seen as an important
part of the dialogue,” not least because the Convention system expects rights to
be protected at the national level in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
Judges may not express views on cases pending before the Court but can discuss
judgments already delivered as long as they are careful to respect the secrecy of
deliberations. This dialogic approach was also considered to include judges who
teach at universities. This activity helps “to promote awareness of Convention
rights,” which one participant saw as being “of great importance for the proper
functioning of the Convention system.”
A similar practice was operational within the African system for the
protection of human rights, with one participant discussing the 2013 dialogue
73
program hosted by the ACtHPR with chief justices of African countries. This
approach was considered both necessary, as there is a lack of awareness of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights amongst some domestic judges,
and fruitful, given the opportunities it presented to discuss the challenges relating
to the enforcement of judgments.

73. See Press Release, Afr. Ct. of Hum. & People’s Rights, Dialogue between the Court and National
Judiciaries in Arusha (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/news/latest-news/488seminar-on-the-judicial-dialogue-between-the-african-court-and-national-judiciaries-opens-in-arusha (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Considering the position of the Andean regional system, another participant
echoed what had been said about the European and African systems, emphasizing
the value of judicial dialogue in terms of awareness raising among the domestic
judiciary, and also as a tool for promoting regional integration.
Other judges took a more reserved approach to this form of judicial dialogue,
suggesting that this kind of communication can backfire. An example from the
ICTR was provided: after a visit by Tribunal officials to the Rwandan
government in Kigali, a participant recounted, “a number of motions were raised
during trials asserting that the ICTR was biased as it had met with the president
of Rwanda.”
Another participant confirmed that he would not accept an invitation to
discuss legal issues relating to matters that were the subject of ongoing
adjudication or even prospective cases on which a judge may in future sit, for fear
of having his perspective affected. Other participants also shared the view that
such consultations between domestic and international judges were “not
advisable.” Another participant “agree[d] entirely,” recognizing “a fundamental
danger of compromise and judicial embarrassment.” Speaking more concretely,
this participant noted an ongoing process considering an application for the
disqualification of a judge who had addressed a number of domestic judges about
international law problems that had arisen in the court.
Similarly, speaking of the process whereby the Rwandan authorities have
begun trying cases referred by the ICTR, one judge explained his view that it
would be inappropriate to provide training to the Rwandan courts out of concern
that he may later find himself sitting on the revocation bench if an application for
74
revocation [of the authority to try ICTR cases] were to be made.
Instead of judicial dialogue taking the form of a close conversation, one
participant favored the approach of making the reasoning behind judgments very
clear, to help to avoid fragmentation of international law. In this way, domestic
judges, as well as judges in other international courts and tribunals, would better
understand how and why a particular decision was reached in a particular case,
and how relevant legal principles are understood within that body.
Interestingly, it was made known during the course of the discussions that the
BIIJ convener, the International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life at
Brandeis University, had itself sponsored a number of colloquia bringing
together international and domestic judges. It could not be said whether some of
the concerns raised by participants during the Institute had been entirely avoided
during the colloquia, but participants were invited to consider the documentation

74. A revocation process is currently underway in the case of Prosecutor v Jean Uwinkindi, Decision on
Request for Revocation of an Order Referring a Case to the Republic of Rwanda and Assigning a Trial
Chamber. Case. No. MICT-12-25-R14.1 (Mechanism for Int’l Crim. Tribunals, May 13, 2015).
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about the colloquia on the Center’s website and reflect on the relative benefits
and drawbacks of such an initiative.
4. Addressing Problems in the Implementation of Judgments
In relation to issues of compliance with states’ international obligations, one
judge saw benefits in a “naming and shaming” approach. However, it was
recognized that judges have very limited power in this context, with another
participant noting, “most of what should be done should not be done by the
courts, but by states.”
Another participant observed: “I think that in our zeal for ensuring
compliance we sometimes go too far. We forget about the nature of judicial
bodies which are independent and impartial, and anything that can compromise
and put in question that impartiality will ruin the credibility of the judicial body.”
Interestingly, a participant with a background in international criminal law
turned the previous proposition on its head by arguing that enforcement of
judgments is crucial to ensuring the credibility of the international judicial body.
In that connection, he observed that in the statute of his tribunal, the president is
responsible for ensuring the enforcement of judgments. Similar observations had
been made in the context of the CCJ in relation to the connection between
enforcement and legitimacy. Another view was advanced in reply, which asserted
that it is the parent body of an international criminal tribunal that should be
concerned with enforcement, as opposed to the tribunal itself.
The reference to the responsibility of parent bodies for the enforcement of
judgments prompted further observations regarding practice in different contexts.
One participant commenting on the role of the Security Council in ensuring
compliance with the judgments of international criminal tribunals expressed the
view that the Council would not seek to compel a state to act, while another
emphasized the fact that states nevertheless had a legal obligation to comply.
It was not only parent bodies such as the UN Security Council that were seen
as having responsibility for ensuring compliance with the judgments of
international judicial bodies. A different mechanism was identified in the context
of ITLOS, where compliance with judgments regarding deep seabed mining is
76
monitored by the International Seabed Authority, an autonomous international
organization established under UNCLOS. Another participant identified a similar
mechanism within the European system for the protection of human rights where

75. Judicial Colloquia, BRANDEIS INT’L CTR. FOR ETHICS, JUST. & PUB. LIFE, http://www.brandeis.
edu/ethics/internationaljustice/judicialcolloquia/index.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
76. About the International Seabed Authority, INT’L SEABED AUTH., http://www.isa.org.jm (last visited
Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe monitors the compliance
of states with the judgments of the ECtHR. Yet another participant commented
on the approach taken by the Assembly of Heads of Government regarding
compliance with the judgments of the ACtHPR. Here, the African Court is
required to report to the Assembly on compliance at every sitting of the
Assembly, which take place every six months.
It would therefore appear that although enforcement is a crucial
consideration for all international judicial bodies, there is no consensus about
the methods that courts may use for seeking to achieve it. Variation in approach
notwithstanding, most participants acknowledged the importance of having an
effective political body to monitor the implementation of their institutions’
judgments.
E. Conclusion
With none of the participants in this session disputing that political factors
impact in various ways upon the work of international courts and tribunals, the
main point of contention turned on whether and how international judges should
respond to these pressures. Although holding divergent views on the desirability
of judicial activism, most participants considered the need to communicate with a
wide range of stakeholders to be a relatively uncontroversial element of a court’s
mandate
Regrettably, communication alone cannot release international judicial
bodies from external pressures, as the next session on the pace of international
justice revealed.
III. THE PACE OF JUSTICE
A. Introduction
The pace at which international justice proceeds is a topic that has arisen at
each of the Brandeis Institutes since its inaugural session in 2002. In 2015, the
organizers decided to devote a special session to the issue and address it head on.
Tying in with previous discussions around the role of politics in international
justice, this session addressed the reality of political pressure that is exerted on
courts and tribunals to resolve cases more quickly, as well as some of the ways in
which political factors impact the pace of international justice itself. Participants
were also invited to look beyond the political dimension and reflect upon the full
range of factors relevant to two important questions, namely, how to define, and

77. Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,
COUNCIL OF EUR. (2014), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/default_en.asp (last
visited Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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then how to achieve, the right pace of justice for a given international judicial
body.
It was acknowledged at the start of the session that multiple stakeholders
have an interest in the pace of international justice. First, “parent bodies” of
certain international courts and tribunals want to ensure that the institutions they
established to address war crimes and mass violations of human rights complete
their work in a timely fashion. Frequent calls for completion of proceedings—to
bring about both political resolution and budgetary relief—have been keenly felt
particularly by international criminal tribunals with temporary jurisdictions.
Furthermore, victims of international crimes and human rights violations may
feel an individual need for the “closure” that judgment and sentencing of the
convicted might bring. Pressure to dispense justice within a reasonable time
frame exists in other kinds of international fora as well, as the strict timetable for
completion of cases established by the WTO Appellate body attests. At least one
participant expressed during the session the familiar notion that “justice delayed
is justice denied.”
The issue of pace carries high stakes for many international courts and
tribunals; indeed, external evaluations of their performance on this score may
have implications for their very legitimacy. It has been noted, for example, that
delays in the resolution of cases at the ECtHR sometimes exceed the maximum
time limit set by that same body for judicial proceedings in the domestic courts of
78
its member states. Such inconsistencies do not pass unnoticed by the Court’s
constituents.
To launch the discussion, participants considered three articles relevant to the
topic of pace, each with its own insights into the issue. An article by A. AlvarezJimenez celebrates the approach taken by the WTO Appellate body (AB), which
79
consistently delivers judgments in cases within its ninety-day target. AlvarezJimenez attributes the AB’s achievement to its adoption of streamlined
procedures, which include limitations on both the time afforded for consideration
of the case and the submission of evidence by the parties, the smaller size of the
judicial panels (decisions are taken by divisions of three Members), and the
flexible approach AB members take in determining the outcome of a case
(distinguishable in particular from the ICJ which allows dissenting opinions,
whereas the AB does not). An issue for discussion by participants was whether
the approach taken by the AB would be feasible or desirable in different
international judicial contexts, for example international criminal or international
human rights bodies.

78. Laurence Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep
Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 133 (2008).
79. Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, The WTO Appellate Body’s Decision-Making Process: A Perfect Model for
International Adjudication?, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 289 (2009).
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Alex Whiting takes a somewhat contrasting approach in his article, which is
80
focused on international criminal adjudication, arguing that delay can
sometimes be a necessary ingredient in these cases. Noting the significant
societal disruption that generally accompanies mass atrocities, Whiting argues
that allowing for the passage of time can enable evidence to emerge with
increased distance from the conflict.
81
Finally, an article by Laurence Helfer touches upon the relationship
between the ECtHR and member states of the Council of Europe. He argues that
the ECtHR has (and should) become more “embedded” in domestic legal orders
through, for example, the Court’s critical engagement with judgments of
domestic courts and tribunals, its ability to act in a fact-finding capacity in some
cases, and its award of specific non-monetary orders that require action by
domestic authorities. When these authorities take responsibility for compliance
with international legal obligations, the result, in theory, is that fewer cases will
come before international judicial bodies.
In what follows, the views of participants on defining the right pace for
international justice are presented, followed by suggested strategies for speeding
up the pace. As regards this last point, it was noted that temporal gains might
have an impact on other aspects of the administration of international justice, not
least in relation to fundamental principles such as the right to a fair trial. Finding
the right balance between the competing pressures of time and quality of
proceedings remains a substantial challenge for many international judicial
bodies.
B. How to Define the Right Pace
In determining the right pace for a particular international judicial body, it is
important to note the factors that can contribute to delay. Certain factors are
common to most international judicial bodies, while other factors are unique to a
particular branch of international law, such as international criminal law.
A 1998 ICJ press release included as background reading for the session
identifies a number of factors that are common to many international courts and
82
tribunals. First, the sheer increase in the volume of cases before a court affects
the pace of international justice. Workload is an issue that has particularly
affected the ECtHR, which has received a greatly increasing number of
applications on an annual basis. Participants from other courts and tribunals also
identified workload pressures as a significant cause of delay in proceedings.
80. Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered, 50
HARV. INT’L L. J. 323, 323–29, 360–64 (2009).
81. See Helfer, supra note 78.
82. Press Release, Int’l Ct. of Just., The International Court of Justice Revises its Working Methods to
Expedite the Examination of Contentious Cases (Apr. 6, 1998), available at http://www.icjcij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=618&pt=&p1=6&p2=1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Workload will always be relative to the capacity of the available staff working
within the court or tribunal to perform their particular functions. Regrettably,
several judges observed shortages in this area, with particular impediments seen
as resulting from a shortage of translating and interpreting staff.
More generally, the issue of language was seen as a source of considerable
delay for some courts and tribunals, particularly where translation of judgments
and other documents into second languages was required. In one international
criminal tribunal, it was observed that first instance judgments may be as long as
1,500 pages, which can take up to two years to translate. Considering that any
appellate process cannot proceed before the judgment has been translated into the
other working language of the court, the implications for the pace of international
justice are clear. Similarly, a participant with experience of international hybrid
courts noted the costs for translation of documents amounted to approximately
twenty-five percent of the court’s budget.
Staffing levels owe much, of course, to the budget of an international judicial
body. Funding was thus seen by many participants to impact directly on the
ability of their courts and tribunals to efficiently carry out their work.
Another element related to staffing, which will vary among institutions, is
what some participants considered to be a negative incentive to follow efficient
working practices. Where staff find themselves employed with comfortable
salaries and secure jobs, there may be an individual interest in seeing a slower
pace of justice than could otherwise be attained. In some cases, participants
observed this perspective at the level of judicial as well as support staff, raising
serious ethical issues. Although perhaps not alone in this experience, hybrid
courts were identified as being particularly vulnerable to this phenomenon.
However, a judge from a regional court also recognized that members of the
bench sometimes seemed to enjoy the perks of their position without actively
seeking to fulfill the mandate of the court.
Finally, procedural matters, perhaps the area most within the power of
international judges to address, were identified as causing delays in some cases.
However, the need to strike the right balance between efficiency strategies and
procedural safeguards was seen as critical. Some of the ways in which procedural
matters affect the pace of international justice included the right of the accused in
criminal cases to self-representation, and the need to reach a consensus in the
writing of judgments. The latter point hearkened back to the Alvarez-Jimenez
83
article where the single judgment procedure was deemed the most expeditious.
However, some BIIJ participants did not agree that the publication of dissenting
opinions significantly slows down the pace of proceedings.
If the factors above were seen as relevant to most international judicial
bodies, other factors raised were particular to different types of proceedings. It
was recognized that the nature of international criminal proceedings differs
83. See Alvarez-Jimenez, supra note 79.
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substantially from both inter-state dispute resolution and the processing of
international human rights claims. There are several reasons for this. First, the
scale of mass atrocities in countries like the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
Cambodia and Lebanon places particular demands on the judicial bodies
charged with determining individual guilt or innocence. These situations have
also created many victims and witnesses, whose participation in proceedings
inevitably takes time.
Second, as Whiting observes in his article, mass atrocities cause severe
individual and societal disruption, which creates significant impediments to the
gathering of evidence. As one criminal judge observed, “We have to make sure
that the proper evidentiary foundation is there to ensure we can adjudicate. It
might be different where the parties control the case and have interests in the
speed of proceedings.”
Third, the role of states is critical in the work of international criminal courts
and tribunals. Participants noted that state cooperation was essential for
investigations as well as for tracking and arresting persons accused of
participation in international crimes, and that such cooperation was not always
forthcoming.
Here then, the question of how to define the right pace for particular
international judicial bodies begins to move towards some tentative answers. For
international criminal justice, the speed of proceedings is important, but cannot
outweigh the need for procedural safeguards or ignore the scale of disruption
caused to individuals and societies by mass atrocities. For human rights and
inter-state dispute resolution proceedings, the need for a timely outcome may
weigh more heavily.
C. How to Achieve the Right Pace
It was clear from discussions that the subject of pace was of concern to many
of the BIIJ participants. Focusing primarily on the steps that courts and tribunals
can take independently from other actors, the group identified a range of
procedural mechanisms that can help to speed up the pace of proceedings.
However, as several judges noted, what gains are made with regard to pace may
entail consequences in other areas, not least the administration of justice itself.
The approach taken in recent years by the ECtHR provides an example of
the delicate balance that exists between efficiency and the administration of
justice. For years the Court has struggled under an enormous backlog, which
84
had reached more than 140,000 cases by 2010. With the entry into force in
June 2010 of Protocol 14, the Court began implementing a single-judge
procedure for determining the admissibility of individual claims—until that
time, three-judge panels had carried out this work. The need for such a
84. EUROPEAN CT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 6 (2011).
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streamlined procedure was highlighted by the fact that ninety percent of claims
85
are ultimately determined to be inadmissible.
While recognizing that reduction from a backlog of 140,000 to 70,000 cases
demonstrates undeniably the effectiveness of the single-judge procedure,
participants raised serious concerns about the implications of the new approach
in terms of potentially diminished procedural safeguards. Whereas previously an
applicant whose claim was determined to be inadmissible would receive written
reasons supporting the finding, applicants are now issued with a standard letter
with no reasoning. Some participants saw this as a serious threat to the
legitimacy of the court. Balanced against these concerns, however, was the view
that “most of the cases are unquestionably inadmissible.” The upshot is that
although challenges to the legitimacy of the court owing to delays in processing
claims are diminished, in their place have come new challenges based on the
loss of depth, breadth of judicial oversight, and communication of reasons
supporting the decision.
Another way of accelerating the pace of proceedings was discussed in
relation to international criminal cases. At the ICTY, judges have the power to
limit the number of witnesses that may be called in a case, and to set time limits.
Although these powers have the potential to impact on the quality of justice
administered, it was observed that discretion rests with the judge to determine
what is required in the individual case. Participants with knowledge of the
system did not consider there to have been adverse impacts resulting from the
use of these powers. As one participant observed, judges “are the masters and
they must be the ones to ensure that the pace is acceptable.”
Reducing duplication across proceedings was considered to offer potential
efficiency savings in some contexts. For example, judges may take judicial
notice of findings that have been made in other cases as well as facts considered
to be “common knowledge.” Such observations were made in the context of
both international criminal and international human rights courts and tribunals.
Addressing the performance of individual judges was considered to be
somewhat more problematic, with one participant noting that there were
“complicated and cumbersome political issues that could not be cured instantly.”
The issue of judicial selection proceedings was seen as relevant to this issue. It
was also suggested that having a case management strategy, where cases are
tracked so that judges know their performance is being monitored, might prove
beneficial. A further step might involve the presiding judge having a “friendly
discussion” with a slow-moving judge and offering support staff to spur an
increase in pace.
As regards factors beyond the control of the court itself, some participants
pointed to the potential role of the UN Security Council in being firmer with

85. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Amending the Control System of the Convention, Explanatory Report, C.E.T.S. 194, at ¶ 5 (2009).
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states that fail to comply with their international obligations. Others viewed such
an idea as merely “wishful thinking.”
On a final note, it is worth recalling that not all courts are weighed down by
heavy workloads. The CCJ, a relatively new international judicial body, actively
seeks cases. Consequently, the Court interprets the admissibility criteria
expansively, in stark contrast to the ECtHR, which introduced a threshold test,
through Protocol 14, requiring that a claimant demonstrate the purported human
rights breach has caused “significant disadvantage” as an additional way of
86
reducing the number of cases crossing the bench.
IV. CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: HELP OR HINDRANCE?
A.

Introduction

Earlier in the institute, participants examined the interrelationship of
international judicial bodies and domestic actors as it plays out within institutions
of government. In this session, the focus shifted to the particular role of local and
international NGOs, as representatives of civil society, in the administration of
international justice. The overarching question for this session was what role, if
any, NGOs should have in proceedings in international courts and tribunals. This
question invited discussion on the forms of interaction that already exist between
NGOs and international judicial bodies, as well as the sharing of experiences and
thoughts about good practice in this domain.
Participants were invited to consider two academic works that address
aspects of the relationship between NGOs and international judicial bodies. First,
87
a piece by Eduardo Szazi advocates for a stronger role for NGOs in
international justice and describes forms of interaction between NGOs and
international judicial and “quasi-judicial” bodies, including the ICJ, ICTY, ICTR,
ICC, CJEU, ECtHR, IACtHR, WTO, and smaller regional bodies. Many of the
forms of interaction he identifies, including participation in litigation both as a
party and through submission of amicus curiae briefs, were discussed in depth
during the session.
88
Second, an article by Anna Dolidze provides an overview of the developing
role of amicus briefs in international proceedings in tribunals, including in
criminal courts, human rights courts, the ICJ, the WTO AB, and ITLOS. From
her compilation, participants could see a cautious growing use of amicus briefs in
cases before international tribunals. Issues raised by Dolidze include whether
86. Id. at ¶ 12.
87. Eduardo Szazi, NGOs in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies, in NGOS: LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).
88. Anna Dolidze, Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability for International Seabed Mining
(ITLOS Case No. 17) and the Future of NGO Participation in the International Legal Process, 19 ILSA J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 1 (2013).
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amicus briefs are a positive development and what limitations should exist on
submission and consideration of the briefs. This subject received robust
consideration during the session.
In what follows, the different ways in which NGOs interact with
international judicial bodies are presented from the perspective of the BIIJ
participants. Following some general observations, two forms of interaction are
discussed: those that are ancillary to judicial decision-making, and those that seek
to influence the process of deciding cases.
B. Different Ways in which NGOs Interact with International Judicial Bodies
It was recognized at the outset of the discussion that the benefits and
drawbacks of the increased involvement of NGOs in the pursuit of international
justice were identifiable along a scale from wholly negative to wholly positive.
This distinction was made a number of times in the session through the refrain
“there are NGOs and then there are NGOs . . . .” At one end of the spectrum were
a relatively small number of very high caliber NGOs that assist the cause of
international justice in many ways. At the other end were NGOs that engaged in
manifestly one-sided advocacy.
To some extent, the nature of the interaction will depend on the profile of the
NGO. Several participants pointed to credibility considerations when discussing
how their courts and tribunals engaged with different civil society organizations.
For example, one participant recounted learning that an NGO had provided
misleading information to the court, which made the institution very cautious in
the contacts it had with that organization thereafter. The type of NGO involved in
international justice, and the ways in which it is involved, also depend on
whether the institution is an international criminal, human rights, or inter-state
dispute resolution body.
1. Activities that are Ancillary to Judicial Decision-making
The discussion began with an examination of the following NGO activities
that are for the most part ancillary to judicial decision-making: lobbying,
provision of technical support, representing the views of stakeholders, and the
monitoring of international judicial bodies.
a. Lobbying
One participant saw the role of NGOs in lobbying for certain conduct by
states as being the main contribution that NGOs can make to the cause of
international justice. “What should be encouraged is essentially the impact on
the behavior of states and their attitudes towards the court.” The ability of
NGOs to influence political decision-making through advocacy and lobbying
411
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activities was seen as having exceptionally positive impacts in some
circumstances.
One participant asserted that there was “no question at all that NGOs over the
years have proven themselves to be indispensable to the creation and
sustainability of some international criminal institutions.” Another pointed to the
substantial contribution of NGOs in the establishment of the ICC as an example
of the positive role that such organizations can play in the interests of
international justice. Yet another participant recalled the role of the Coalition for
the International Criminal Court (CICC), which, at the time of the entry into
force of the Rome Statute, consisted of more than 1,000 NGOs. The CICC
lobbied intensively in multiple countries to secure the sixty ratifications
89
necessary for the Rome Statute to enter into force.
The CICC was also seen as having played an instrumental role in reforming
the process of electing judges to the ICC. A participant noted that, prior to
establishing an Assembly of States Parties Advisory Committee on
90
Nominations, “There was no vetting of the qualifications of judges who were
nominated by countries. Rather unfortunate appointments were made, including
91
judges who qualified under neither List A nor List B, as required in the Rome
Statute. The Coalition set up an independent committee of eleven people for the
2011 elections . . . [and after vetting the candidates] publicly announced that of
the fifteen or so nominees at the time, three were not qualified.” None of those
three candidates was subsequently elected.
b. Provision of Technical Support
Harking back to the issue of the cost of international justice, touched upon
during earlier discussions, one participant provided an example of how NGOs
can be instrumental in the operation of international courts and tribunals where
parent bodies, such as the United Nations, do not provide sufficient resources.
Referring to the role of the International Bar Association (IBA) in the Tadić
92
case, this participant explained: “the IBA was responsible for ensuring that the
Tadić trial was a fair trial. The UN said that they would only pay for one lawyer.

89. Our History, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/? mod=cicchistory (last visited
Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
90. See Int’l Crim. Ct., Establishment of an Advisory Committee on the Nominations of Judges of the
International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/10/36, Annex, adopted by the Assembly of States Parties by Resolution,
ICC-ASP/10/Res.5., (Dec. 10, 2010).
91. Article 36 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court sets out that two lists shall be
prepared regarding candidates for judicial office in accordance with their professional experience, either in the
practice of law (for example as a judge, prosecutor and so forth) or as a person with established competence in
an area of relevance, such as human rights or humanitarian law. Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 183/9 (1998), art. 36.
92. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May
7, 1997).
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His lawyer had never observed, let alone conducted, a cross-examination. The
IBA employed two British barristers as part of the team and then the UN took
over the cost. This was hugely important to ensuring a fair trial.”
Similarly, in the inter-state dispute resolution context, one participant noted
that NGO assistance to smaller states with limited resources involved in litigation
before the WTO was considered positive. This topic was discussed in detail
during BIIJ 2012, in particular the important role played by the Advisory Centre
on WTO Law in assisting developing countries to write briefs and develop legal
93
arguments.
c. Representing the Views of Stakeholders
It was recognized by participants that the role of NGOs in communicating
the views of stakeholders could have clearly political overtones. For example,
some participants considered demonstrations organized by NGOs outside of
international criminal courts and tribunals as unhelpful, if not necessarily
harmful, to the interests of international justice. Other ways of representing the
views of stakeholders were considered more beneficial to the administration of
international justice. For example, the role of NGOs as facilitators of
communication with different interest groups was seen as potentially very
important. Speaking about a regional court, one participant noted that its
decisions, which are binding on the member states, have “important cultural,
value-laden implications . . . In those circumstances where the court is making
law not just to the parties, but for the community, we listen to all voices
interested in being heard on a topic like that.”
In the context of international criminal justice, one participant described the
STL practice of inviting a wide spectrum of NGOs based in Beirut to The Hague
to exchange views on the Tribunal. It was observed that “[The STL] shares with
other international tribunals the problem of distance justice. Less than one fifth of
[the] personnel are in Beirut. NGOs are an invaluable means of helping to get
over that problem. [The STL] periodically invite[s] all NGOs in Beirut—not just
those in favor of the Tribunal—to a meeting, which goes on for several hours . . .
The result is a spectrum of opinion. There are direct criticisms but the
opportunity to fire back is precious.”
In regard to the “legacy initiative” of the ICTY, one participant referred to
94
conferences that had taken place in The Hague, Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade,
to which numerous NGOs were invited. The participant observed, “These
conferences . . . were well-attended and the discussions were quite hot. Some

93. BRANDEIS INST. FOR INT’L JUDGES, THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW: COORDINATION AND
COLLABORATION IN GLOBAL JUSTICE 30 (2012).
94. Legacy Conferences, U.N. INT’L CRIM. TRIB. OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://icty.org/sid/11449 (last
visited Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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people made a nuisance of themselves but [the conferences] were a huge
success.”
NGOs representing groups of victims in international criminal cases were
also seen as providing an important line of communication between courts and
victims in some contexts. However, this activity was not entirely unproblematic.
Speaking about the wide scope for victim participation in the ICC, one
participant noted that NGOs were sometimes responsible for creating
expectations that the court may not be able to satisfy.
A representative of a hybrid criminal court described the very cautious
approach taken with regard to interactions with NGOs and the particular
premium placed on transparency. “Judges do not meet with NGOs individually.
We may attend public fora, but only if we are sure that the defense and
prosecution are also represented. We are careful about that. We have capacity
building through [international organizations] on our terms and ensure that the
prosecution and defense are involved. We don’t want any [interaction] with any
NGO that is not entirely transparent.”
d. Monitoring of International Judicial Bodies
The role of NGOs in monitoring international courts and tribunals, be it their
proceedings or other aspects of their operation, was met with a qualified
welcome by many participants.
Describing the attitude of a hybrid court, one participant stated, “We
welcome NGOs monitoring us. However, one major complaint about NGOs in
monitoring is that I wish they would be competent. They send people who are not
experienced. We get comments that are ill-founded and inappropriate. At any
time, we have fifty NGOs looking at us. This is, I think, an industry and it is selfperpetuating. They are good at commenting on the rights of the prosecution and
victims and poor at commenting on the rights of the accused.” Thus, for this
participant, a more competent and balanced oversight by NGOs was called for.
In relation to the ICC, some participants felt that the monitoring of the Court
by NGOs was not entirely positive. One participant observed, “There is this sort
of ‘mission complex’ on the part of NGOs. They think they are destined by God
to watch the ICC in perpetuity, particularly in this early age where the Court still
has to blossom and they will be watching each and every step . . . it is there and
working, and the more interference, the worse it gets.” Another participant
agreed that NGOs might broaden their focus to the anticipated growth in the
domestic pursuit of international criminal justice, but did not wish to exclude the
role of NGOs in supporting the ICC.
Other participants identified examples where the monitoring of the
administration of international justice by NGOs was largely helpful. The role of
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Human Rights Watch in monitoring ICTR cases that have been referred to
95
Rwanda, for example, was seen in a positive light by one participant.
96
The Coalition for an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
an umbrella NGO representing a diverse group of over 300 individuals, academic
institutions and other organizations, was identified by one participant as being
actively engaged in monitoring the Court, but also in communicating directly with
the Court: “Any time [there is] a session, they have a meeting. If [there are] public
hearings, they attend. At meetings, judges come and interact and discuss . . . .
They make comments on procedure, what they think is good and not good.”
Such helpful activities notwithstanding, it was observed that sometimes the
interest of NGOs in monitoring the work of international judicial bodies can go
too far: “[They] wanted to be in attendance in our in camera hearings and wanted
to sit in on our deliberations,” said a participant. “That was truly amazing!”
2. Activities that Seek to Influence Judicial Decision-making
Participants expressed the need for greater caution when the discussion
turned to the different ways in which NGOs may seek to influence the process of
judicial decision-making itself. One participant noted that different
considerations arise depending on the nature of the judicial body. As one
participant observed: “It is clear that when you have a criminal court, where there
is the strict principle of legality, interference has to be discouraged. It can be
different in human rights courts where it is the individual against the state. It is a
different kind of procedure. The inter-state case may again be different.”
In what follows, observations of participants regarding the role of NGOs in
gathering evidence, lobbying, participation in litigation and submitting amicus
curiae briefs are presented.
a. Gathering Evidence
NGOs can assist the cause of international justice by contributing to the
process of gathering evidence. In some cases, evidence gathered by NGOs has
been admitted into evidence for trials at international courts and tribunals. A
participant with insight into the ICC considered the work of NGOs such as
Human Rights Watch to be important at the investigation stage and noted that the
prosecution had based findings on the evidence provided by that NGO. This
participant left open the question to what extent such reports could be used as
evidence at the pre-trial and trial stages.
95. See e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, RWANDA: JUSTICE AFTER GENOCIDE: 20 YEARS ON, at 8–9 (Mar. 28,
2014).
96. About Us, COAL. FOR AN EFFECTIVE AFR. CT. ON HUM. AND PEOPLES’ RTS., http://www.african
courtcoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=73&Itemid=47&lang=en
(last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Speaking about the experience of the ECtHR, one participant noted that
reliance is placed on reports by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, not least
when the Court is asked to issue a Rule 39 injunction prohibiting the expulsion of
a person to a country where there is the risk that the person will be exposed to
97
serious human rights violations.
NGOs can also assist by providing training on the conduct of investigations.
98
The intergovernmental facility Justice Rapid Response was identified as
conducting international criminal investigations as well as providing training.
The benefits provided by this kind of organization included that investigations
are conducted “in a professional manner so that [material] can be used as
evidence” and they “only have the agenda of the body that commissions them.”
The participant continued: “This type of NGO might be able to play a significant
role in the future . . . [T]rials concerning mass atrocities always happen years after
the events occurred and investigation on the part of the Prosecution in these
courts commences very late. It would be more effective if we had some kind of
99
investigative body in place, maybe while events are taking place.”
Again, the activities of NGOs within the territory where mass atrocities were
committed gave rise to the refrain “there are NGOs and then there are NGOs . . .”
One participant with experience in Kosovo recounted how some NGO workers
would arrive “with no money and expect funding from UN agencies for food and
accommodation.”
In relation to evidence-gathering itself, participants from several international
criminal tribunals identified the inappropriate handling of evidence as being a
significant issue. One judge commented, “What [the prosecution] have told me is
that [the NGOs] contaminate the evidence so the prosecution can’t use it.”
Another participant noted that some NGOs have impacted upon cases by seeking
to influence witnesses.
b. Lobbying
Although, as noted earlier, lobbying is predominantly an activity that is
ancillary to judicial decision-making, at times NGOs can lobby with the aim of
influencing the outcome of specific proceedings. A participant brought up the

97. European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, entered into force June 1, 2015. Rule 39 sets out
the interim measures provision. Id.
98. About Us, JUST. RAPID RESPONSE, http://www.justicerapidresponse.org/who-we-are/about-us/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
99. Since BIIJ 2015 took place, the International Bar Association has launched the “eyeWitness to
Atrocities” app, which will allow those filming or photographing abuses on their smartphones to document the
exact time and place of the events and save them to a secure archive, so that the images can be used later as
evidence in court proceedings. See About Eyewitness: Project Description, http://eyewitnessproject.org/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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100

Brđanin trial, in which the ICTY Prosecutor sought to subpoena Washington
Post war correspondent Jonathan Randal, who refused to testify, citing a
qualified journalistic privilege not to give evidence. It was noted that substantial
101
lobbying efforts took place around the question, which ultimately became a sort
of “trial within a trial.” The original decision of the Trial Chamber to subpoena
102
Mr. Randal was ultimately overturned by the Appeals Chamber, which
considered an amicus brief submitted by thirty-four press companies and
associations of journalists.
103
Interestingly, one participant, referring to the Arctic Sunrise case at ITLOS,
expressed the view that the Russian Federation may have felt that it would be
hard to receive an impartial judgment from the Tribunal following the intensity
of both political and civil society pressure brought to bear in the case.
c. Participating in Litigation
A less common way in which NGOs interact with international courts and
tribunals—and which may be unique to human rights cases—is through direct
involvement in litigation as an interested party or by providing legal advice and
assistance to an interested party. Describing the rules in force at the ACtHPR,
one participant explained that NGOs only have access to the court if they have
observer status with the Commission and the state party has made the declaration
104
allowing them access. This participant noted that NGOs had been directly
involved in three cases before the Court, in which they had filed as applicants,
with an affected individual identified as a second applicant.
NGOs are also entitled to seek an advisory opinion from the African Court,
but here the NGO must be recognized by the African Union, not the
100. Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Judgment, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 1195 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia, Sept. 1, 2004).
101. See William Safire, Enter the Globocourt, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2002), http://www.
nytimes.com/2002/06/20/opinion/20SAFI.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review);
Journalist Forced to Give Evidence to Rights Court, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (June 13, 2002),
http://en.rsf. org/bosnia-herzegovina-journalist-forced-to-give-evidence-13-06-2002,02595.html (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review); 12 IFEX Members Support Legal Appeal of Subpoenaed Reporter,
IFEX (Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.ifex.org/2002/08/13/12_ifex_members_support_legal_appeal/(on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
102. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin &
Momir Talic “Randal Case”: Appeals Chamber Defines a Legal Test for the Issuance of Subpoenas for War
Correspondents to Testify at the Tribunal (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/8047 (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
103. The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (Neth. v. Russ.), ITLOS Case No. 22, Order of Oct. 25, 2013, available
at https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/C22_Ord_2013-3_25Oct13_E_opening_
of_ hearing__2_.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
104. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHR/PROT (III). Article
5(3) provides for the institution of cases by NGOs and individuals provided the relevant state has accepted the
jurisdiction of the court to hear such cases under Article 34(6) of the Protocol. Id.
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Commission. An example of NGOs making use of this entitlement can be found
in the request made by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) and the Southern
African Litigation Centre (SALC), which requested an advisory opinion on the
105
legality of the suspension of the SADC Tribunal (referred to earlier in the
report). In a different kind of NGO/Court interaction, the ACtHPR also has a
106
practice of referring applicants to the Pan African Lawyers Union when they
are in need of legal assistance.
According to one participant with knowledge of the ECtHR, the European
Convention on Human Rights protects not only individuals but also legal
persons, thus enabling NGOs to bring claims as victims of human rights
violations, which might involve, for example, issues relating to freedom of
expression or the right to privacy. NGOs are also involved in litigation brought
by individuals, and can assist in preparations for the proceedings, although they
cannot (generally) bring a case on behalf of a particular individual.
But the general exclusion of NGOs from having standing in individual claims
at the European Court appears to allow for an exception in certain cases.
Recalling the Grand Chamber case of Centre for Legal Resources on Behalf of
107
Valentin Câmpeanu, which concerned the death in an institution of a person
with mental and physical health challenges, one participant noted that the Court
had ruled in that case that the NGO was able to lodge the claim themselves on
behalf of the deceased “applicant,” given the exceptional nature of the case.
108
Notably, several other NGOs also intervened with amicus briefs in this case,
including Human Rights Watch, the Euroregional Center for Public Initiatives,
the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and the Mental Disability Advocacy Center,
particularly with reference to the question of the standing of the Centre for Legal
Resources. This participant considered the case to offer a greater opportunity for
NGOs to participate directly in litigation before the ECtHR, and found it
surprising that it had not received more attention.
d. Amicus Curiae Briefs
The issue regarding the role of amicus curiae briefs in the pursuit of
international justice received robust consideration during the session, with a
range of different practices and perspectives brought to the discussion. Although

105. In the Matter of a Request by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) and Southern African
Litigation Centre (SALC) for an Advisory Opinion Before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 2012, (A.Ct.H.P.R. Nov. 23, 2012).
106. What PALU Does, PAN AFR. LAW. UNION, http://lawyersofafrica.org/what-palu-does (last visited
Feb. 12, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
107. Centre for Legal Resources on Behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania, App. No. 47848/08, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 789 (2014).
108. Briefs were submitted with the permission of the President under Article 36 § 2 of the Convention
and Rule 44 § 3 of the Rules of the European Court of Human Rights.
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amicus briefs are submitted by states, academics, and various entities, NGOs in
particular often seek to file them.
In relation to the role of amicus briefs in the international criminal context,
109
one participant pointed to the intervention in the ICTY Furundzija case by the
Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations as an example of a
helpful contribution. The brief concerned the re-opening of proceedings, calling
for full disclosure of medical and psychological records, and allowing cross110
examination of a witness in relation to those records. The participant
considered the submissions to be “very important for the purpose of the case.”
Another participant with experience in the ICTY said that the Tribunal had
not received many applications for filing of amicus briefs. However, Rule 74 of
the ICTY Rules of Procedure specifies, “A Chamber may, if it considers it
desirable for the proper determination of the case, invite or grant leave to a State,
organization or person to appear before it and make submissions on any issue
111
specified by the Chamber.”
Participants with experience in the ICTR noted the contribution of amicus
briefs, particularly in relation to cases referred to the Rwandan courts. The ICTR
has faced challenges in some of these cases owing to complicating “equality of
arms” factors, including situations where the prosecution requests a referral, the
Rwandan government is invited to make submissions, the accused is a fugitive,
or there is a lack of experienced duty legal counsel in any proximity to the court.
For this participant, amicus briefs offering insight into the Rwandan legal system
“provided the balance we needed.”
As for other criminal institutions, the ICC has, according to one participant,
accepted amicus briefs from NGOs, but only “sparsely.” The ECCC can invite or
grant leave for an amicus brief from either an organization or person. However,
“[the ECCC] does not want someone pushing a particular agenda, and [it is]
careful about that,” said one participant with insight into that institution. The STL
has also invited amicus briefs in several cases. One participant recalled the
valuable contribution of the numerous briefs submitted in relation to the question
of whether non-natural persons may be prosecuted for contempt of court,
following the publication by a Lebanese media outlet of the names of purported
112
confidential witnesses before the Tribunal. In that case, an open invitation to
“any interested party, such as media organizations, non-governmental
109. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former
Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998).
110. Amicus Curiae Brief Respecting the Decision and Order of the Tribunal of 16 July 1998 Requesting
that the Tribunal Reconsidering Its Decision Having Regard to the Rights of Witness “A” to Equality, Privacy
and Security of the Person, and to Representation by Counsel, Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-9517/1-T, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia).
111. Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 74, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/REV.49 (May 22, 2013).
112. In the Case against NEW TV S.A.L. & Karma Mohamed Tahsin Al Khayat, Case No. STL-1405/T/CJ, (Special Trib. for Lebanon 2015).
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organizations, or academic institution” was issued by the Contempt Judge.
Twenty briefs were submitted, for example from the President of the Beirut Bar
Association, the Order of Lebanese Press Editors, a former Lebanese Prime
Minister, and the legal representatives of victims in a related case.
The role of amicus briefs appeared to be significant for human rights courts.
The ACtHPR appeared very welcoming of amicus briefs, with one participant
noting: “[NGOs] must apply to the Court, stating the reasons why they want to
submit an amicus brief and [the Court] then makes a judicial ruling on whether the
NGO should be allowed to file the brief or not. . . . the briefs are quite good and
well researched, so it reduces [the judges’] research work. [The Court] almost
always allows them to come.” The ECtHR also makes provision for the admission
of amicus briefs according to an admissibility procedure under Rule 44 of the
113
Rules of Court. Here, as with other international courts and tribunals, the focus
is on whether the submission is “in the interests of the proper administration of
justice,” which is doubtful where the intervention appears, as one participant
noted, “too biased or general.” There are substantial examples of amicus
114
interventions in ECtHR jurisprudence, including in many Grand Chamber cases.
In relation to inter-state dispute resolution mechanisms, the ICJ appeared to
have a somewhat unique approach to the submission of statements or documents
by international NGOs in advisory opinion cases. In accordance with Practice
115
Direction XII, such documents are not to be considered as part of the case file,
but will be treated as publications readily available and may be referred to by states
and intergovernmental organizations presenting written and oral statements in the
case in the same manner as publications in the public domain. ITLOS followed a
similar procedure with amicus briefs in a recent case in which the briefs were not
part of an official case file, but were nonetheless treated favorably in that the
submissions were posted on an accessible website. In general, though, ITLOS rules
do allow for the possibility of amicus submissions by intergovernmental
organizations.
Somewhat in contrast to the restrictive approach taken by the ICJ, the ATJ
invites extensive involvement by NGOs in many aspects of the Tribunal’s work,
including in relation to proceedings. According to one participant, “the position the
Tribunal has now is to try to get into the proceedings as much of civil society as
possible, as this kind of work reflects directly on our society. The more they
provide their views and participate, the better the integration process.” Regarding
113. European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, entered into force June 1, 2015. Rule 44 is titled
“Third-party intervention.” Id.
114. See Laura Van den Eynde, An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human Rights
NGOs Before the European Court of Human Rights, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271, 282 (2013). Van den Eynde
identifies the involvement of over 140 NGOs in the case law of the ECtHR. Interestingly, she finds that the
intervention of amici does not increase the likelihood that the Court will find a violation. Id.
115. Practice Directions, INT’L CT. OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/
index.php?p1=4&p2=4&p3=0 (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
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the question of procedure, the participant observed, “there is no explicit rule
against it. So if [there is no rule against it, the Tribunal] can admit it.” This position
116
echoes that adopted by the IACtHR, as noted in the Szazi article. Addressing the
possibility that such an open approach to participation in proceedings before the
ATJ could become overwhelming, this participant expressed the view that the
technical nature of many cases made it unlikely that the Tribunal would receive
substantial applications to intervene.
Still other institutions, such as the CCJ, were considering amending their
Rules of Procedure to allow for the submission of amicus curiae briefs. The CCJ
has decided to engage with NGOs and formalize the process of their
participation. Under the proposed new rules, amici can submit written briefs and
can even make oral submissions at the Court’s discretion. Some national
governments have questioned these steps on the ground that these developments
threaten to slow the judicial process and increase costs. Additionally, NGOs are
not legal individuals, further complicating their relationship with the Court. The
CCJ is exploring whether cost orders could be made and be imposed against
NGOs. However, there is no question that wider participation will be accorded to
the participation of civil society.
From the discussion it was clear that most international courts and tribunals have
come to accept amicus curiae briefs, albeit following differing criteria. Some courts
accept applications to submit briefs whereas others adopt a practice of inviting
submissions on questions when the court or tribunal requires expert insight. Several
participants felt that what mattered most was not the method chosen for dealing with
amicus briefs, but that there was some form of admissibility procedure.
On a final note, in addition to the issue of admissibility, the issue of
procedural fairness was also raised in relation to the submission of amicus briefs
that support one side in an adversarial procedure. Here, views seemed to
emphasize the need for a contextual approach to the question, with one
participant noting, “There is really a situation in which the court would have to
take into account that, if it admits a brief on the law that goes in a certain
direction, [someone] should submit a brief in the other direction . . . But it really
depends on the situation, in particular the situation in favor of the accused. It is
not necessary to adopt a protective approach for the prosecution.”
C.

Conclusion

By the end of the session it was clear that NGOs have come to play a significant
and often positive role in the administration of international justice. Activities that
seek to directly support international courts and tribunals were naturally very well
regarded by participants, although plainly unhelpful activities, such as disseminating
inaccurate information about judgments and the workings of international judicial
116. See Szazi, supra note 87.
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bodies, were criticized. Between these extremes, however, there lay considerable
variation in practice and perspective, based in part on the nature of the judicial body
(criminal, human rights or inter-state) and in part on the particular activity being
considered. Where NGO activities sought to influence the decision-making process,
for example through the submission of amicus curiae briefs, some judges adopted a
very cautious approach whereas others invited a wide range of submissions. Where
activities sought to bring the perspectives of stakeholders to the attention of the
court or tribunal, many participants were welcoming although others saw the need
to exercise considerable caution in this connection as well.
As one element of the dynamic relationship between international judicial
bodies and local actors, the answer as to whether NGOs are a help or hindrance
to the cause of international justice depends, as with many issues discussed
during the Institute, on who is asked.
V. THE LOCAL IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
A. Introduction
International judicial bodies are charged with adjudicating cases that come
before them on the facts presented. However, depending on the nature of the
court or tribunal, there will be a wider or narrower range of stakeholders who are
affected by the resulting judgment. The purpose of the institute’s final session
was to explore the impact of international justice at the local level from the
perspective of international human rights courts, international criminal courts and
tribunals, and inter-state dispute resolution bodies. Several aspects of this impact
were discussed, including the decisions of international courts and tribunals that
are binding on states not party to the proceedings, the specific role of domestic
courts in applying international law, and the proper approach the international
judge should take with regard to the potential local impact of a judgment.
As a starting point, the session focused on the politically charged issue of
migration in the Mediterranean, an issue that has only increased in significance
since the Institute took place in January 2015. As background for this discussion,
participants had read a report entitled Access to Protection: A Human Right?
117
National Report—Malta, which describes the numerous international law
challenges presented by migration in the Mediterranean. These include, amongst
other things, obligations of non-refoulement under international refugee law and
international human rights law, as well as the duty to rescue under the
international law of the sea.

117. JEAN-PIERRE GAUCI & PATRICIA MALLIA, PEOPLE FOR CHANGE FOUND., ACCESS TO PROTECTION:
A HUMAN RIGHT? NATIONAL REPORT—MALTA (2013).
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B. Migration in the Mediterranean—The Local Impact of Judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights in the Maltese Response to Irregular
Movement
At the start of the session, three cases from the ECtHR relevant to the
118
Maltese context were presented. The first two cases, Aden Ahmed v. Malta and
119
Suso Musa v. Malta, concerned Malta’s practice of detaining asylum-seekers
and the conditions of detention. In Aden Ahmed, the Court held that Malta had
violated the applicant’s right not to be exposed to inhuman or degrading
treatment, as guaranteed by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, due to the conditions of detention in which she had been held. The
adverse conditions included the fact that “dormitories were shared by so many
people with little or no privacy, that she suffered from heat and cold, that an
inadequate diet was provided, that there was a lack of female staff to deal with
120
the women detainees and above all that there was a lack of access to open air.”
The Court reiterated the principles elaborated by the Grand Chamber in M.S.S. v.
121
Belgium and Greece concerning the obligations of host states towards asylum
seekers, including in the context of immigration detention.
In both the Aden Ahmed and Suso Musa cases, the Court also found
violations of Article 5 of the European Convention, namely the rights not to be
arbitrarily detained and to be provided with a means of challenging the
lawfulness of detention. In Aden Ahmed, for example, there was no evidence that
the Maltese authorities had taken any steps to arrange for the removal of the
applicant from Malta during the entire period of her detention, despite the
requirement that a person shall only be detained for as long as deportation or
extradition proceedings are in progress. In both judgments, the Court recalled
numerous previous instances where it had found Malta’s legal procedures to fall
short of its obligations under Article 5.
In relation to the central theme of the session—the local impact of
international justice—the questions that emerged for participants were the extent
to which states may prefer to act in breach of their international obligations and
the conditions under which they may consider it appropriate to do so. It was
noted that Malta had operated a system of almost automatic immigration
detention of asylum seekers for many years, and there are clear political
incentives for the continued practice, notwithstanding occasional chastisement
122
and financial penalties imposed by the European Court of Human Rights.

118. Aden Ahmed v. Malta, Final Judgment, App. No. 55352/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. 720 (Sept. 12, 2013).
119. Suso Musa v. Malta, Final Judgment, App. No. 42337/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. 721 (Sept. 12, 2013).
120. See Aden Ahmed v. Malta, supra note 118 at 30, ¶ 92.
121. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, Judgment, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 108 (Jan. 21, 2011).
122. It is worth noting that significant developments on the policy and practice of detention have taken
place since these decisions. Indeed, at the end of 2014, there were only thirty people in detention. The Malta
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123

The final case, Abdi Ahmed and others against Malta, concerned a
challenge by a group of migrants to their proposed expulsion to Libya. According
124
to the case’s statement of facts, more than one hundred migrants in a boat off
the Maltese coast were intercepted in 2013 by the Armed Forces of Malta.
Without being given the opportunity to apply for asylum, the migrants were
issued with removal orders and taken to a location in the vicinity of the airport.
During that day, the Maltese prime minister was asked what the government was
planning to do with the migrants. His reply was reported as follows: “All the
options are being considered. This is not a question of push-backs. This country
has to send a message and we are sending a message that we are considering all
the options, that we are not pushovers.” When asked whether he was aware that
push-backs were illegal, the prime minister responded, “We are considering all
options in the interest of the country.”
Media outlets subsequently reported that two Air Malta flights had been
booked to ferry the migrants back to Libya that night. Acting as “persons
125
concerned,” according to Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECtHR, The
People for Change Foundation and the Jesuit Refugee Services, supported by a
group of NGOs, applied to the Court for an interim measure prohibiting the
expulsion of the migrants. The act of applying for the injunction itself gave pause
to the government, with the Prime Minister, in the process of confirming that
arrangements for the transfer of the migrants to Libya were in place,
commenting, “While undertaking these considerations we have been verbally
informed that a number of NGOs have lodged a request for an interim measure
before the ECtHR, to stop a decision which the Maltese Government has not yet
taken. We are still waiting for a written confirmation of this procedure and all
these points . . . I reassure this House that the Government’s, the people’s and the
country’s obligations towards the rule of law and the decisions of the ECHR [sic]
126
will be respected.”
The acting president of the Section handling the Rule 39 application decided
to grant the application and informed the Maltese authorities that the migrants
should not be removed for the duration of proceedings before the Court. He also
asked the Maltese authorities to provide information. According to the statement
of facts, “following the interim order the migrants were transferred to the regular
detention centers and detained in accordance with the provisions of the
Immigration Act. UNHCR was granted access to the applicants in the evening of

Human Rights Report for 2015, published by The People for Change Foundation, provides useful information
in this regard. PEOPLE FOR CHANGE FOUND., MALTA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2015 (2d. ed. 2015).
123. Abdi Ahmed & Others against Malta, Decision, App. No. 43985/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4, ¶ 14 (Dec.
16, 2014).
124. Id. at 2, ¶ 3.
125. European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, entered into force June 1, 2015, at Rule 39.
126. Abdi Ahmed & Others against Malta, Decision, App. No. 43985/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5, ¶ 19 (Dec.
16, 2014).
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that same day. The applicants learnt about the situation and the original
127
Government’s plans only at that time.”
This case provided BIIJ participants with clear evidence of the local impact
of the ECtHR as an institution whose authority is respected by the Maltese
authorities, and whose procedures for the protection of human rights are known
and accessible to sections of civil society who use them to effectively protect
individuals vulnerable to human rights violations. At the same time, the scenario
as described highlights a weakness in the system, given that the case came
approximately a year and a half after the Grand Chamber judgment in Hirsi
128
Jamaa. In this case, the ECtHR ruled that Italy was in breach of Article 3 of the
European Convention by intercepting boats at sea and forcing them to return to
Libya, where there was a risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment and a
further risk of onward refoulement to countries of origin. Moreover, the interim
measure application was followed by another instance where the Maltese (and
Italian) authorities instructed the master of the MT Salamis, a private vessel, to
return migrants it had rescued to Libya, instructions which were challenged by
the master and led to the vessel being out at sea for some days before finally
landing in Italy.
To what extent, then, was Malta bound by the Hirsi judgment? This question
elicited a robust discussion, revealing differing perspectives on the issue of the
wider application of rules of international law as interpreted by international
courts and tribunals.
C. The Extent to which Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals Bind
Non-parties
A first point in the discussion was that the extent to which non-parties may
be bound by a judgment would depend on the court or tribunal that issued it.
Here, one participant observed that the statute of the ICJ provides that its
decisions are binding on the parties to the particular litigation, but considered
that, perhaps, while bearing in mind the fact-specific aspects of judgments, a
different approach may be required in a human rights context.
Speaking of the European system for the protection of human rights, one
participant observed that while each case turns on its individual facts, the case
law that has been developed by the Court can have wider implications for states
not party to the litigation. Thus, whereas the Hirsi case turned on the specific
facts relating to the actions of the Italian state authorities toward ships carrying
non-citizens seeking to enter the EU, the principle that a state taking control over
a vessel at sea has jurisdiction for the purpose of establishing responsibility for
the protection of human rights under Article 1 of the European Convention is of
127. Id at 6, ¶ 22.
128. Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy, Judgment, App. No. 27765/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1845 (Feb. 23, 2012).
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wider application. Nevertheless, this participant emphasized the fact-specific,
individual nature of the Strasbourg process, which would suggest that the
existence of the Hirsi jurisprudence would not automatically entail a breach of
Article 3 by the Maltese authorities had they returned the migrants in the Abdi
Ahmed case to Libya. A fact-specific, individual assessment would have to be
conducted in order to establish the extent of Malta’s obligations on a case-bycase basis.
Similarly, reference by the Court in the Aden Ahmed case to the principles in
129
the Grand Chamber judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece reflects the way
in which the Court develops principles of wider application as part of its
consideration of a particular set of facts in an individual case.
In an effort to have a more widespread impact at the local level, the Court
130
has introduced a pilot judgment procedure, now codified by Rule 61 of the
Rules of Court, with one objective being to “assist the [forty-seven] European
States that have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in solving
systemic or structural problems at national level.” Judgments are specifically
directed at states party to the litigation, but in a more expressly prescriptive way
than judgments that are restricted to the resolution of an individual complaint.
Examples of measures requested by the Court include, for example, “to introduce
. . . at the latest within one year from the date on which the judgment became
final, an effective domestic remedy against excessively long court
131
proceedings.”
The wider application of the judgments of the African Court was also
acknowledged by a participant with knowledge of that system. When an
application is filed with the African Court, notice of the application is given to all
state parties, but there is no obligation to participate. Judgment is served on all
state parties, although no decision has been taken as to the extent to which these
judgments are binding on non-parties to the litigation. An example of the
potential efficacy of this practice was provided in relation to a finding by the
Court that a Tanzanian prohibition on independent political candidates breached
132
the Charter. Not only is Tanzania taking steps to comply with the judgment, but
Nigeria, which has a similar legislative provision, has also taken steps to amend
its constitution in this respect. It remained unclear whether the action taken by

129. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, Judgment, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 108 (Jan. 21, 2011).
130. Press Unit, Fact Sheet: Pilot Judgments, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS. (2015), available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
131. Press Release, Registrar, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Rumpf v. Germany (Application No. 46344/06), First
Pilot Judgment in Respect of Germany: Excessive Length of Proceedings Before German Courts Constitutes
Systemic Problem (Feb. 9, 2010).
132. In the Consolidated Matter of Tanganyika Law Society & the Legal and Human Rights Centre &
Reverend Christopher Mtikila v. The United Republic of Tanzania, Judgment, App. Nos. 009/2011, 011/2011,
(A. Ct. H. P. R. June 15, 2013).
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Nigeria was in response to the judgment of the African Court, but the participant
recognized the possibility.
Thus, for human rights courts, it would appear that the scope for judgments
impacting non-parties is significant, even if such parties may choose not to
acknowledge the relevance of particular judgments for political or other reasons.
Speaking from the perspective of inter-state dispute resolution mechanisms,
one participant explained that, with an exclusive focus on addressing the specific
subject matter of the dispute between the parties, courts and tribunals such as the
ICJ and ITLOS frame their judgments in a way that allows a margin for the states
to decide how they will implement them. “[Inter-state courts and tribunals] try to
avoid interfering into . . . how that will be implemented as it is counterproductive
and interferes in domestic means. [Inter-state courts and tribunals] rely on the
fact that states will find the right means to implement [the judgment]. At least for
the inter-state courts, this is the common approach adopted in every judgment.”
As for international criminal courts and tribunals, it may be observed that
some judgments can have a persuasive authority in other international criminal
jurisdictions, and there was also substantial discussion of the legislative and
operational measures states may take to both facilitate the work of these
international judicial bodies and to develop domestic legal systems to promote
complementarity. Whether the judgments of international criminal courts and
tribunals actually contribute to the reduction of impunity in the world remains,
however, an open question.
D. The Role of Domestic Courts in Applying International Law
As observed at the outset of the Institute, an important way in which
international law has local impact is through the work of the domestic judiciary.
The concept of embeddedness as discussed in the Helfer article was seen by one
participant as having particular relevance to the issue of the local impact of the
133
European system for the protection of human rights. This participant noted that
national courts “repeatedly refer to the case law of the [European] Court as
guidance on how to interpret the national legislation and the Convention in the
national context.”
The already mentioned case heard by the South African Constitutional Court,
concerning the duty of the South African Police Service to investigate allegations
of torture against Zimbabwean citizens in Zimbabwe by Zimbabwean officials,
was also seen by one participant as an example of “harmonization” between
134
national and international criminal courts.

133. See Helfer, supra note 78.
134. Nat’l Comm’r of S. Afr. Police Service v. S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Litig. Ctr. and Another, 2014 ZACC 30
(CC) (S. Afr.).
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Finally, the example of the Nevada Supreme Court responding to the Avena
135
case reaffirms the view that domestic courts are playing an increasingly active
role in all aspects of international justice.
E. To what Extent Should International Judges Be Concerned with the Local
Impact of Their Work, and What Should They do About It?
To the extent that these questions concern the need for judges to be conscious
of how judgments will be received by different stakeholders, including the
general public, one participant considered it desirable for international judges to
take pains to explain how a decision was reached. “I think that judges should be
careful not only to explain the judgment itself in the reasoning part of the
judgment, to make it persuasive to lawyers and themselves, but also to be aware
of the possible impact of the judgment in order to avoid misunderstanding. This
is an important consideration for a judge.”
This participant gave the example of the judgment in the Jurisdictional
Immunities case concerning compensation awarded by Italian courts against the
136
German state for crimes committed during the Second World War. He pointed
to the general emotional feeling that the conduct of Germany in relation to the
Italian victims who were not compensated was not commendable. He explained,
“The Court went out of its way in its judgment to say that the judgment does not
mean to say that Germany is free from responsibility. It was free from the kind of
responsibility the [Italian] Court of Cassation claims it has, but compensation
was not paid to a group of people who suffered, and that should be left to further
negotiation between the parties. [This passage was] totally irrelevant to the text
of the judgment but it was important to say that and to make the position of the
Court clear and be acceptable to public opinion, which was justifiably enraged by
what Germany did and the implication of soft judgments.”
A second example concerned the ICJ advisory opinion in the Kosovo
137
Independence Case. Having expressed the opinion that the declaration of
independence was not prohibited under international law, the text “tried to
explain that this view was not an endorsement of the declaration in a legal sense.
It answers the question posed, which was whether what the Kosovo authorities
did was legal in the eyes of international law . . . This is also relevant to public
attitudes . . . “
Importantly, while this judge saw the importance of explaining a judgment in
a way that could help the wider public to understand how it was reached, there

135. Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012).
136. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 6.
137. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (Jul. 22).
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was no question of allowing public pressure to influence the decision-making
process itself, or the factors that are taken into consideration.
F. Conclusion
Just as domestic factors impact upon the work of international judicial
bodies, so too does the work of international judicial bodies impact in many ways
at the local level: legislation is updated, individuals are compensated, and retrials
are ordered. However, reflecting back to the first section of this report, the
Westphalian legal order does not invite consideration of a system of international
law that includes one or several international judicial bodies whose decisions are
binding on all states, as opposed to the states that are party to particular litigation
(and only then to the extent that the states are willing and/or able to be bound).
Although there appears to be a greater expectation of harmonization across states
parties to regional human rights agreements, in this context as well there is no
binding system of judicial precedent such as that found in common law
jurisdictions. Moreover, notwithstanding a general trend towards adapting the
domestic legal framework to respond to judgments of regional human rights
courts, there are at times powerful political incentives against adaptation. This
last observation recalls the dominance of the state sovereignty paradigm, where
compliance with international legal obligations is generally considered desirable
by most states, so long as their crucial interests are not compromised.
BREAKOUT DISCUSSIONS
I.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

Judges hailing from international criminal courts, along with colleagues from
human rights jurisdictions, identified victim participation in proceedings and the
definition of charges as the central topics to address during their breakout
session. Comparison of varying processes, challenges, and benefits among the
courts made for a lively and diverse discussion.
A. Victim Participation
There was general agreement that the introduction of victim participation
into criminal proceedings was made with good intentions; mass atrocity trials call
for mass participation. The group conceded, however, that having victims
participate in the trials of alleged perpetrators is fraught with challenges.
Deciding who can participate is a primary challenge. At the ICC, for
example, only victims affected by the crimes charged by the prosecution, as
opposed to those affected by the general situation, can participate or receive
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138

reparations. As one judge observed, “from the point of view of victims, this
mechanism is discriminatory. Some will have access and some will be left out.
This is clearly not in the interest of the victims themselves.” The general feeling
was that limiting victim participation undermined the goal of bringing victims
into direct contact with justice procedures.
Maintaining “equality of arms” was another major concern raised—it was
argued that having victims represented in the courtroom serves to double, in
effect, the strength of the prosecution. One judge counter-argued, however, that
trials with co-accused persons also represent an inequality of arms, although one
that has not been called into question. Furthermore, it was argued that the
victims’ representatives at the ICC do not overpower the defense since they are
more concerned with battling the scope of the prosecution’s case. There was
some disagreement as to whether victim participation created an unfair trial, and
if so, to what extent.
A third concern—and one that built upon the earlier session on the pace of
justice—was that victim participation prolongs proceedings, thereby infringing
on the right of the accused to a trial without undue delays. The ECCC serves as a
case in point. Its proceedings have faced significant delays since “civil parties”—
that is, victims of the crimes in question—run into the thousands. These parties
can request investigative action, and then they usually appeal when their requests
are denied. The result is a significantly slowed down justice procedure. The
numbers of victims wishing to participate in proceedings is also increasing,
which exacerbates the problem. The ECCC’s first trial had ninety civil parties;
the second saw almost 4,000 come forward. The ICC has seen a similar jump,
with 129 victims represented at its first trial, 366 for its second, and almost 5,000
139
for its third.
Perhaps one of the most pertinent critiques raised was the high cost of
maintaining victim participation programs. The fact that fifteen percent of the
ECCC’s budget goes towards victim participation was offered to support this
point.
The place of reparations in victim participation was also discussed. At the
ICC, reparations only come at the end of proceedings if the accused is found
guilty. However, even with a guilty verdict, victims may not feel that the
reparations offered meet their needs. In some cases, there can be a concern that
collective reparations awarded to victims could spur reprisals, especially in cases
where the reparations come at a time when the conflict is still ongoing.
Furthermore, some victims say that they prioritize ending the conflict above all
else. Therefore, even when reparations are eventually distributed to a limited
pool of victims, this action may not align with local priorities. In comparison, at
the ECCC, victims can approach donors to request reparations. Most victims
138. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 183/9 (1998), art. 57.
139. These figures, drawn from the respective court’s websites, are accurate as of March 2015.
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request symbolic reparations, such as memorials or public ceremonies that
acknowledge their suffering, since they realize that financial reparations are
essentially unattainable.
The judges in the breakout group widely recognized a need for reforming
victim participation as it exists currently, although they had a variety of opinions
about what form it should ideally take. Some participants went even further,
however, and suggested that victim participation be eliminated altogether. One
judge proposed that the ICC remove victims from criminal proceedings and
provide reparations solely through the Victims’ Trust Fund, which would also
incorporate some form of truth-telling process for victims. Another judge cited
potential precedent for such reform in the resolutions of the UN Congress on
Crime, which dictate that the international community has a responsibility to
compensate victims irrespective of whether the person responsible for the crime
is tried, punished, or can provide compensation.
Meanwhile, another participant offered the STL as an example of how victim
participation can actually work. The Tribunal’s positive experience in this area
was attributed to professionalism on the part of the victims’ counsel and
limitations placed on that role. It was recommended that victim participation be
tightly controlled rather than “flinging the baby out entirely with the bath water.”
There was also discussion about restricting victim involvement to opening and
closing statements, which would afford victims emotional catharsis without
obstructing the trial.
By the end of the discussion, the general consensus, as expressed by one
participant, was that victim participation “is not of general direct assistance in
reaching conclusions.” Furthermore, while it can be effective in some kinds of
justice procedures, “in the mass atrocity crimes there are problems and it is not a
very good idea in practice.”
B. Definition of Charges
The second subject the judges addressed was the question of “who defines
the charges in international criminal law proceedings,” a question that
encompassed both a literal comparison of different courts’ modalities and a
normative discussion of how charges should be defined. It was acknowledged
that confirmation of charges procedures varied between courts. At the ICC, the
prosecution defines the charges in the Document Containing the Charges, which
is approved by the Pre-Trial Chamber. That Chamber’s exact means of approving
the charges or requesting greater clarity has varied by case. At the Lebanon
Tribunal, a single pre-trial judge either dismisses or remits an indictment. The
case then goes to a Trial Chamber, which sees the case for the first time.
There was disagreement as to whether a single judge or a panel of judges was
preferable to confirm the charges and whether the same judge(s) should then
serve during the trial phase. It was highlighted that a judge confirming the
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charges and then sitting on the trial would know excluded evidence. On the other
hand, it was mentioned that when there is no crossover in the judges, evidence
has to be disclosed a second time and this prolongs the process. Ultimately, there
was a wide variety of opinions about the optimal procedures for pre-trial
confirmation of charges.
Several problems with current confirmation of charges approaches were
also discussed. One judge expressed concern that an initial lack of clarity in the
charges and evidence allows “cherry picking” of both later during the trial
phase. This risks “surprising” the defense and undermining the overall fairness
of the trial. In one case at the ECCC, the charges were adjusted during an
appeal process on the grounds that issues of law since the initial charges had
been brought were long and convoluted. There was ultimately a retrial, which
included facts established in the previous trial, which disrupted the strategy of
the defense. Participants also recognized that sometimes there are discrepancies
between what the prosecution discloses during the pre-trial phase and the trial
phase, for example when witnesses remember additional information.
The breakout group concluded with a brief discussion of a recent judgment
140
issued by the ECtHR on the admittance of hearsay evidence at trial. In the
141
United Kingdom’s R v Horncastle case, the UK Supreme Court upheld a
decision allowing hearsay evidence. This case was appealed to the ECtHR, which
had previously held that hearsay could not be the sole or decisive evidence
proving guilt of the accused, and it eventually came before the Grand Chamber.
The ECtHR ultimately held that its mandate is not to create law but to ensure fair
trial standards, that admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation
by national law, and furthermore that English common law has developed
sophisticated counterbalancing tests to ensure a fair trial. The original
convictions were thus held to entail no violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
One judge highlighted that evidentiary rules in the common law are based on
the jury system, and juries are absent from international criminal trials. There had
previously been debate whether the use of both juries and hearsay evidence could
arguably infringe Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Article 14 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which both
guarantee the right to a fair trial.
Indeed, the ideal of a fair trial, and how it can be guaranteed in the face of the
various policies and practices of international courts and tribunals, constituted the
common thread in the criminal breakout group discussions.

140. Horncastle v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, App. No. 4184/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 16, 2015).
141. R. v. Horncastle [2009] U.K.S.C. 14 (appeal taken from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)
(U.K.).
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II. INTER-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION COURTS
During the inter-state dispute resolution breakout session, two primary
topics were discussed. The group continued the exploration of issues
surrounding the implementation of international decisions at the national level
from the perspective of their respective institutions, and also discussed various
aspects of the use of experts appointed by tribunals to clarify issues.
A. Implementation of Decisions at the National Level
The implementation of decisions plays out in different ways according to
the country concerned. Countries have a certain amount of discretion regarding
implementation, which sometimes generates confusion and even nonimplementation. This issue also covers the question of compliance with
decisions at the national level. This is especially true at ITLOS where no
provision for ensuring compliance with its decisions exists. In the ICJ’s case,
there is the UN Charter, which permits the Security Council to involve itself
when non-compliance occurs. The question for each judge during this session
was: How do issues of implementation affect the inter-state dispute resolution
regime?
It was pointed out that the ATJ faces implementation challenges in relation
to its different kinds of procedures. For example, the Tribunal may nullify any
decision from either the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers or the
Commission of the Andean Community, and even any resolution from the
General Secretariat of the Andean Community, which violates the Cartagena
Agreement. There have been several such cases and no serious implementation
issues have been encountered. Once the ATJ has struck them down, they are
already void. Other cases require specific non-compliance procedures. These
occur when countries pass national legislation that is contrary to the legislation
of the Andean Community, or they are developing administrative measures that
hamper the integration of the Andean Community. In such cases, the parties
raise claims and the Tribunal decides whether the measures in question are
hindering the integration process. Some governments tend to be reluctant to
immediately accede to decisions that rule that their policies are against
integration. The Tribunal can respond through regulatory measures, such as
permitting the country that brought the suit to institute a retaliatory policy.
Unfortunately, a participant declared, “this creates a generalized noncompliance of the entire process, because country A is, for example, hampering
free trade and the measure we impose is to allow country B to do the same
thing.”
Fortunately for the ATJ, it does have compulsory jurisdiction. This means
that if it renders clear decisions, there is no way for the decision to be
manipulated or misconstrued within the bounds of the law binding the
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community. The Tribunal thus has the responsibility to make quality decisions
that limit the ability of recalcitrant states to twist the Tribunal and its decisions
to their own political ends. Additionally, there is a growing push to include
more businesses and civil society representatives in the process, as decisions
largely affect economics and social relations, not just government policy. This
may have the added benefit of reducing non-compliance, as more actors are
invested in a successful judicial process and will demand government
compliance.
One of the most important procedures, and that which constitutes the vast
majority of cases before the ATJ, is to provide preliminary rulings
(interpretaciones prejudiciales) through which the ATJ advances an
interpretation of the legislation of the Andean Community. Its purpose is to
ensure the uniform application of such laws across the territory of member
countries. During the last two years, the ATJ has received four times the
number of requests for preliminary rulings (nearly 500) than in previous years.
The importance of the preliminary ruling procedure is greater than its
statistical relevance. As a rule, the development of Andean law is based on
preliminary ruling procedures. Binding interpretation of Andean law by the
ATJ is to ensure legal unity within the Community in everyday practice. The
procedure also acts as an instrument of cooperation between national judges
and the Community judges so that they can together preserve this unity through
uniform interpretation and application of Community law.
The CCJ faces some similar issues to the ATJ, although the CCJ (unlike
CARICOM’s Competition Commission) cannot initiate non-compliance
actions. There is a referral procedure for matters involving the interpretation or
application of a regional treaty. A national court or other tribunal is required to
refer the cases involving the interpretation or application of the Revised Treaty
of Chaguaramas to the CCJ, but there have been no referrals in in the Court’s
ten years of existence. National courts in the CCJ system are granted wide
scope in resolving cases on their own, and can decide not to refer a case if it
believes the matter may be properly resolved without a referral. The European
system and ATJ require referral in similar cases. It is important to note that
regional courts do not decide the dispute, but provide the requested treaty
interpretation that the national courts then apply to resolve disputes. This does
mean that if the regional court produces an overly broad interpretation, this
does not aid the national courts in their tasks to decide actual cases. Whilst not
dictating an outcome, it may be necessary for the regional court to be as
definitive as possible.
As for the other inter-state courts, it was found that the ICJ and ITLOS
share elements regarding implementation issues. These often stem from the
following scenario: (1) A national court issues a judgment that creates a
situation where the state is in non-compliance with its international obligations;
(2) The matter then goes to an international judicial body—the ICJ, ITLOS, an
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arbitral tribunal, etc.—which renders a decision on the matter; (3) However, the
implementation of this decision may not be straightforward because the
executive branch cannot unilaterally enforce the international decision due to a
separation of powers. Rather, the international ruling must be adopted through
an internal judicial process. There does not seem to be a solution to this
problem, barring significant constitutional reform in many states; instead
international courts must trust supreme national courts to respect their rulings.
Despite the provision in the UN Charter that dictates compliance with ICJ
decisions, the World Court is not immune to issues of non-implementation. The
142
Avena case, discussed in Section I of this report, illustrates this amply. The
ICJ decision interpreted the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR)
as requiring a review and reconsideration of the conviction and death sentence
given to fifty-four Mexican nationals, taking into account a violation of the
notification provision. In circumstances where the violation was not raised until
post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings, U.S. law prohibited such a review.
Although the United States was bound by the 2004 ICJ decision in Avena, the
143
U.S. Supreme Court held that the decision was not binding in U.S. courts.
Without enforceability directly in judicial proceedings, a legislative response
was needed. After several failed attempts, a partial solution was finally reached
ten years later. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in 2014
144
to require notification at the initial appearance hearing. Some U.S. states, too,
have incorporated the notification provisions into their criminal procedure
codes. There is, however, no general right to a hearing on a VCCR violation if
it is not raised before the federal habeas corpus stage as required by the Avena
decision. A case like Avena requires a more comprehensive legislative solution
that has not been forthcoming. This unfortunately means that most of the
Mexican nationals in the case never received judicial relief.
B. Use of Experts Appointed by Courts and Tribunals
The question presented by this topic was whether or not it is advisable for
the court to appoint experts on its own. For example, is it appropriate for courts
to bring in experts to offer internal expertise to the judges, without the consent
of the parties? In some international courts and tribunals, experts are treated as
“temporary” assistants to the registry. While this might be necessary when
courts are tasked with adjudicating complex technical cases, questions
remained about whether this is the proper method of using experts.
It was pointed out that civil society commentators sometimes raise questions
about the competency of international judicial bodies to provide judgments that

142. Case Concerning Avena, supra note 15.
143. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
144. FED. R. OF CRIM. P. 5.
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are scientifically well grounded, for example in cases involving environmental
matters like climate change, and border delimitation matters. In the latter, it is
known that experts are brought in to draw boundaries and offer their expertise.
Parties are not, however, necessarily privy to the identity of such experts. A
participant also brought up the ICJ Australia v. Japan case, involving Japanese
whaling, where there was debate about whether the expert testimony from the
145
parties provided sufficient background to render a decision. The International
Whaling Commission’s (IWC) Scientific Committee had not yet finished its
study of Japanese practices, so there was a question as to whether the ICJ was
competent to determine the case without benefit of the IWC’s findings.
Participants generally agreed that international courts should rely on
experts, as they are critically important in giving judges the technical
knowledge they require to make a proper judgment. There do, however, need to
be formalized processes for selecting experts. Cases involving complicated
topics, or fields unfamiliar to the judges, can only be properly adjudicated after
experts have given the judges enough information to understand the subject
matter. It may be difficult to find experts with sufficiently broad and detailed
knowledge, but the effort must be made to ensure the most judicious and
legitimate outcome.
However, it was felt that if international courts use experts behind the
scenes, then there will be no external check on the quality of the advice given
to the court. Moreover, the experts may be given too much influence over the
final decision of the court and the judges will become “hostage [to] what the
experts tell [them].”
This may also be true when external experts are used, however. Even when
the parties play a role in the appointment of experts, it is impossible to be
certain that the experts chosen are the most qualified and unbiased. This can
ultimately result in prejudicial and incorrect judgments, and undermine the
legitimacy of the judicial process.
The proposed solution of having a court-appointed expert has neither been
implemented nor rejected by ITLOS and the ICJ. Right now, these courts
utilize informal confidential consultations with one or more experts. The
experts provided by the party are very useful in fully understanding the
argument made by the party, but the use of court-appointed experts would
perhaps help to ensure neutrality.
PARTICIPATING JUDGES
Carmel A. Agius (Malta) is currently the Vice President of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He is also a member of the
Appeals Chamber of both the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for
145. Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v Japan: N.Z. Intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 226 (Mar. 31).
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Rwanda (ICTR). He was first elected a Permanent Judge of the ICTY in March
2001 and was re-elected in November 2004. In 2011 he was elected by the UN
General Assembly to serve on the Roster of the Residual Mechanism of the two
tribunals. Since his election to the Tribunal, Judge Agius has presided over the
Brđanin, Orić, and the Popović et al trials. He also formed part of the Trial
Chamber which rendered the sentencing judgements in the Dragan Nikolić and
Deronjić cases. He also acted as Pre-trial Judge in several cases. Since 2009 he
has also served on the Appeals Chamber in several appeals from judgements of
the ICTY and ICTR. Currently he is presiding judge in the Stanisić and Zupljanin
appeal. Judge Agius also forms part of the Bureau of the ICTY and chairs the
Rules Committee of the ICTY. Judge Agius was born in Malta in 1945 where he
served on the Constitutional Court and the Court of Appeal before joining the
ICTY. On several occasions he served as Acting Chief Justice. Between 1999
and 2006 he was also a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The
Hague.
Winston Anderson (Jamaica) has been a judge of the Caribbean Court of
Justice since 15 June 2010. He is a graduate of the University of the West Indies
and Cambridge University. Prior to joining the CCJ, Justice Anderson was
Professor of International Law at the University of the West Indies, where he
engaged in the teaching and research of the law for over twenty years. He has
also served as General Counsel of the Caribbean Community. In addition to the
discharge of his judicial duties, Justice Anderson continues to engage in
research. The second edition of his Caribbean Private International Law was
published in August 2014 by Sweet & Maxwell, London, and in 2012 his
Principles of Caribbean Environmental Law was published by the
Environmental Law Institute, Washington. Justice Anderson is a founding
member of the International Advisory Council of the United Nations
Environment Programme (IAC/UNEP), which is mandated to act as a global
voice for environmental sustainability, giving guidance to UNEP, the OAS and
other global organizations.
Sir David Baragwanath QC (New Zealand) is a judge of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon and served as its President from 2011-2015.He was a
barrister for 30 years before being appointed to the High Court and later Court of
Appeal of New Zealand. He served as President of the NZ Law Commission and
presided in the Samoan Court of Appeal for some years. He was active in other
Pacific jurisdictions during his career and had extensive international civil and
criminal experience including appearances before the Privy Council in London.
His academic appointments include universities in New Zealand, the USA, the
UK, the Netherlands and Hong Kong. He is an Overseas Bencher of the Inner
Temple.
David Thór Björgvinsson (Iceland) was a judge at the European Court of
Human Rights in respect of Iceland from 2004 to 2013. He studied history,
philosophy and law at the University of Iceland and legal philosophy at Duke
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University School of Law in the USA. He has a doctorate in international law
from Strasbourg University. Before serving at the ECHR, Judge Björgvinsson
was a professor of law at Reykjavik University School of Law and the University
of Iceland Faculty of Law. His main field of research has been in the field of
general legal theory, EU (EEA) law, and human rights. He has done research in
his field at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, Rand Afrikaans Universiteit
in Johannesburg in South Africa, University of Copenhagen, Max Planck
Institute in Heidelberg, Germany and Oxford University in England. He has held
numerous other positions for public and private entities. Judge Björgvinsson has
written books and published numerous articles on his studies and given courses
and lectured in his field in many countries. Judge Björgvinsson has been seated at
iCourts, the Danish National Research Foundation Centre of Excellence, at the
University of Copenhagen Faculty of Law since 1 Jan 2014.
Luis José Diez Canseco Núñez (Peru) is Justice at the Court of Justice of
the Andean Community, in Quito, Ecuador. He studied law at the Pontifical
Catholic University of Peru (1985), received a Master of Laws at George
Washington University Law School (1988), and is currently a Professor of Law
at the Pontifical Catholic University. He has served as a Fulbright Scholar (19871988), a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow (2001-2002), a Visiting Scholar at George
Washington University Law School (2002), Visiting Scholar at the Max Planck
Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich (1986), and Visiting Scholar at
the Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Spain (1987). His prior professional
positions include Judge at the Competition and Intellectual Property Tribunal of
Peru; Economic Officer at the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD); International Officer at the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO); Legal Counsel at the General Secretariat of the
Andean Community; and General Coordinator of the Competitiveness Program
(Office of the Prime Minister of Peru and the World Bank). His areas of expertise
are Integration Law, International Economic Law, International Trade Law,
Competition Law, Unfair Competition Law, Advertising Law, Consumer
Protection, Market Access, Export Promotion, Antidumping and Subsidies,
Intellectual Property, Judicial Reform and Anti-corruption.
Rowan Downing QC (Australia) holds the degrees of Bachelor of Arts,
Bachelor of Laws and Master of Laws and is a senior Australian lawyer. In 2006
he was appointed through the Secretary General of the United Nations as an
international Judge at the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia. He has held senior judicial positions in the Pacific
region, including Judge of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Vanuatu.
He has also sat on a number of Australian tribunals. He has worked
internationally for more than twenty years undertaking work in law reform,
human rights law, treaty implementation of human rights, refugee law,
administrative law, anti-corruption law and the investigation and prosecution of
transnational crime. Justice Downing has also worked with a number of
438

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47
multilateral organizations to improve the independence of the judiciary and
systemic integrity within legal systems. He has appeared as an advocate in
numerous human rights cases and provided advice to a number of governments
concerning human rights, particularly the rights of women and children. He has
extensive experience training advocates and members of the judiciary in South
East Asia and the Pacific and has a particular interest in victimology and the
operation of hybrid courts.
Vladimir Golitsyn (Russian Federation) is a judge of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and was elected its president on 1 October 2014.
He has been active in the field of International Law for almost four decades. At
the Government level, he has served as Head of the Division of Public
International Law in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the former USSR and as
head or member of delegations at various negotiations on fishery, navigation and
maritime boundary matters, as well as the Arctic and Antarctica. At the United
Nations, where he has worked for 25 years, he has been involved in a wide range
of legal matters, in particular those related to environmental and maritime issues,
as well as such issues as the establishment and implementation of the oil-for-food
program for Iraq, negotiation of arrangements related to the Lockerbie case, etc.
Judge Golitsyn is currently Vice-President of the Russian Association of
Maritime Law and also works as Professor of international law at the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations and the Moscow State University.
Vagn Joensen (Denmark) is the President of the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. He was recently re-elected to serve
a second presidential term commencing from 27 May 2013. Judge Joensen joined
the Tribunal in May 2007 as ad litem Judge and a member of Trial Chamber III.
He has been the Chairperson of the Tribunal’s Rules Committee since its
inception in 2007, and was Vice-President of the Tribunal from August 2011
until February 2012. He was elected in December 2011 as a Judge of the
successor to the ICTR and ICTY, the Mechanism for International Criminal
Tribunals, and has served as Duty Judge for its Arusha Branch since 2 July 2012.
Before joining the ICTR, Judge Joensen was a Judge at the Danish High Court,
Eastern Division, in Copenhagen since 1994 and served as an International Judge
in Kosovo for UNMIK from 2001 to 2002. Born in 1950, Judge Joensen obtained
a Master’s of Law in 1973 at the University of Aarhus, and has studied at the
City of London College and Harvard Law School. Judge Joensen served in the
Danish Ministry of Justice until he was appointed a Judge at the City Court of
Copenhagen in 1982, when he was teaching constitutional, criminal and civil law
at the Law Faculty of the University of Aarhus and at the University of
Copenhagen.
Theodor Meron (United States) was elected to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by the U.N. General Assembly in
March 2001. Since then, he has served on the Appeals Chamber, which hears
appeals from both the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
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(ICTR). Judge Meron is also the ICTY’s current President, elected to this
position by his fellow judges on October 19, 2011 and again on October 1, 2013.
He previously served as President of the ICTY between March 2003 and
November 2005. In December 2011, he was elected by the U.N. General
Assembly to the roster of Judges of the Mechanism for International Criminal
Tribunals (MICT). On February 29, 2012, he was appointed by the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations as President of the MICT for a 4-year term. A
leading scholar of international humanitarian law, human rights, and international
criminal law, Judge Meron wrote some of the books and articles that helped build
the legal foundations for international criminal tribunals. A Shakespeare
enthusiast, he has also written articles and books on the laws of war and chivalry
in Shakespeare’s historical plays. He is a member of the Institute of International
Law, the Council on Foreign Relations and a Fellow of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences. Judge Meron has also served as Co-Editor-in-Chief of the
American Journal of International Law (1993-98) and as Honorary President of
the American Society of International Law. He is Officer of the (French) Legion
of Honour and a Grand Officer of the (French) National Order of Merit. He
delivered the general course at The Hague Academy of International Law on
International Law in the Age of Human Rights (1993) and is an author of eleven
books and more than a hundred articles.
Erik Møse (Norway) is Justice of the Supreme Court of Norway and a judge
at the European Court of Human Rights since 2011. He has previously been
judge (1999-2009) and President (2003-2007) of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda; judge of the Court of Appeals in Oslo (1993-1999);
Supreme Court Barrister (Attorney-General’s office, civil affairs, 1986-1993),
and before that Deputy Judge and Head of Division in the Ministry of Justice. He
chaired, inter alia, the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee for Human
Rights, the expert committee that drafted the European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture, and the committee on incorporation of human rights
conventions into Norwegian law. Judge Møse was for many years a part-time
lecturer at the University of Oslo, has published books and numerous articles
about human rights issues, and is Honorary Doctor at the University of Essex.
Hisashi Owada (Japan) has been a judge of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in The Hague since 2003 and served as President of the Court from
2009 to 2012. Before being appointed to the Court, he was President of the Japan
Institute of International Affairs and professor of international law and
organization at Waseda University in Japan. One of his country’s most respected
diplomats, Judge Owada previously served as Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Japan, as well as Permanent Representative of Japan to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, and Permanent
Representative of Japan to the United Nations in New York. In the academic
field, Judge Owada has taught for 25 years at Tokyo University, and more
recently at Waseda University as a professor of international law and
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organization. He has also for many years been teaching at Harvard Law School,
Columbia Law School, and New York University Law School. He is a member
of l’ Institut de Droit International (IDI) and its former President (20112013). He
is an honorary professor at the University of Leiden and also professorial
academic adviser at Hiroshima University. Judge Owada is the author of
numerous writings on international legal affairs.
Fausto Pocar (Italy) has been a Judge in the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
and the ICTR since 2000 and was president of the ICTY from November 2005
until November 2008. In 2000 he also served on a Trial Chamber of the ICTY.
Judge Pocar has a long-standing experience in United Nations activities, in
particular in the field of human rights and humanitarian law. He has served as a
member and president of the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR and
was appointed Special Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights for visits to Chechnya and the Russian Federation in 1995 and 1996. He
has also been the Italian delegate to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space and its Legal Subcommittee. He is a member of the roster of arbitrators on
outer space disputes of the PCA. He is a professor emeritus of international law
at the University of Milan, where he has also served as Faculty Dean and ViceRector. He is the author of numerous publications on human rights and
international humanitarian law, private international law, and European law. He
has lectured at The Hague Academy of International Law and is a member and
treasurer of the Institut de Droit International, and president of the International
Institute of Humanitarian Law (Sanremo).
Elsie Nwanwuri Thompson (Nigeria) is the first Nigerian to be elected into
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. She was elected on 27 July
2010 for a term of six years. She is currently the Vice President of the Court.
Justice Thompson is a serving Judge of the High Court of Rivers State of
Nigeria. She was called to the English bar in 1984 after an LLB Honours degree
from Queen Mary College, University of London. She was later called to the
Nigerian bar in 1985. Prior to her appointment as a High Court Judge, she was in
active private legal practice for 20 years and worked on human rights cases,
especially on women’s rights. She has served in several associations, notably the
International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) where she held several posts
including Country Vice President (National President) and Regional Vice
President for Africa. Justice Thompson has participated in several seminars and
conferences as a resource person. She has presented several papers on women
and children’s rights as well as other topical legal issues. She also participates
regularly in legal education for students in the areas of seminars and moot courts.
She is a member of the honourable society of Gray’s Inn and also a Fellow of the
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.
Christine Van den Wyngaert (Belgium) is a judge of the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Court. She graduated from Brussels University in
and obtained a PhD in International Criminal Law in 1979. She was a 1974
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where she taught (2005 -ofessor of law at the University of Antwerp (1985 pr
criminal law, criminal procedure, comparative criminal law and international
criminal law. She authored numerous publications in all these fields. She was a
niversity of Cambridge (Centre for European Legal visiting fellow at the U
Research Centre for International Law (1996 ,(1996 -Studies (1994 1997)) and a
visiting professor at the Law Faculty of the University of Stellenbosch, South
Africa. Her merits as an academic have been recognized in the form of a
Doctorate Honoris Causa, awarded by the University of Uppsala, Sweden (2001),
the University of Brussels, Belgium (2010), Case Western Reserve University,
the US (2013), and Maastricht University, The Netherlands (2013). Judge Van
den Wyngaert has been an expert for the two major scientific organizations in her
field, the International Law Association and the International Association of
Penal Law. She was an observer of the Human Rights League at the trial of
Helen Passtoors in Johannesburg in 1986 and has made human rights a focal
point in her teachings and writings throughout her career. In 2006, she was
awarded the Prize of the Human Rights League. In 2013, the Flemish
Government awarded her a golden medal for her achievements in international
criminal law. In 2014, she was elected Vice President of the International
Association of Penal Law. Judge Van den Wyngaert has been granted the title of
Baroness by the King of Belgium for her merits as an academic and an
international judge.
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